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THE RIGHT OF WHO TO BEAR WHAT, WHEN, AND WHERE
-WEST VIRGINIA FIREARMS LAW v. THE RIGHT-TOBEAR-ARMS AMENDMENT
James W. McNeely*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Right to Keep and Bear Arms Amendment to the West Virginia Constitution was approved by the voters of the state by an overwhelming margin on
November 4, 1986. The language of that amendment is a concise statement of a
constitutional right:
"A person has the right to keep and bear arms for the defense of self, family, home
and state, and for lawful hunting and recreation use."

Yet, despite its simplicity, the amendment raises many questions. How broad
is the term "person"? What actions are contemplated in the phrase "keep and
bear"? What weapons are included in the term "arms"? Is the phrase "defense of
self, family, home and state" simply another way of securing the right of selfdefense, or does it establish some new right to armed defense?
Moreover, where is the interpretation of the new article III, section 22 to be
found, so that these and other questions may be addressed? Clearly, the first step
is an understanding of the development of the current body of weapon regulation
statutes, and the state constitutional basis for such statutes. This Article will provide the statutory, common law, and general historical backdrop against which the
constitutional amendment was drafted, proposed, and considered.
A second step in the interpretation is a determination of legislative and voter
intent in approval of the amendment. This intent can be addressed by a broad inquiry: Was it the legislature's and voter's intent to place in West Virginia's Constitution a new section that was consistent with the current statutory law in the
state, or was it their intent to repeal any or all provisions of current law? This
stage of the analysis would review the history of legislative and voter intent for indication of both general intent in terms of the weapons statutes as a whole as well
as specific intent as to particular provisions of state law discussed in the course of
legislative and voter consideration of the amendment.
This determination of legislative and voter intent to be consistent, or inconsistent, with either the general weapons statutes or some particular weapons statutes
would impact in a significant way on the third step of the analysis of the amend-
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ment: the determination of the meanings of the specific phrases and the entirety
of the amendment. The meaning of the constitutional terms would therefore, it is
suggested, be determined by the current operation of West Virginia weapons
statutes and the case law interpreting those statutes if it was the intent of the
legislature and the voters that enactment of the amendment was not to alter current law. This might well result in meanings attached to terms that would be narrower than the apparent meaning of the term or phrase.
Finally, the amendment, defined in the light of legislative and voter intent and
in the context of the development of weapons regulation would then stand in the
constitution as a restriction of the state to take certain actions. But what actions
would be restricted or prohibited? Also, to what extent would the amendment impact on future state statutes that go further than the current state law?
This discussion of the amendment will concentrate on the first two of the four
suggested steps in interpretation of that amendment. The author will first undertake a comprehensive review of the statutory and case law development of the current weapons statutes in the state. This analysis is divided into chronological
periods beginning with the creation of the state, extending into the early part of
this century with the development of the modem weapons statutes, and concluding
with the state of the law in 1986 when the new amendment was approved. Relevant
case law establishing the state court's constitutional and policy interpretations of
legislative actions will be reviewed as part of this historical review.
Having brought the reader to the 1985-86 period in development of the law in
West Virginia dealing with weapons, a close look will be had at the legislative
history of the amendment during the 1985 regular session of the legislature and the
campaign history of the amendment during the 1986 general election. This review
will include selected excerpts from press coverage of both legislative and campaign
activities so that the view of the amendment through the collective eyes of the
citizens can be suggested. Through that review of the history of the amendment,
some determination of general and specific intent of the legislature and the voters
hopefully can be made.
While concentrating on historical development of weapons regulation in West
Virginia and a review of the legislative and campaign history of the amendment,
the author shall conclude with some suggestions as to the meaning of terms within
the amendment, and the meaning of the amendment as a whole, in the context of
whether such meanings should be consistent or inconsistent with the state weapons
regulation existing at the time of passage of the amendment. Certainly a thorough
analysis of the possible meaning of each term in the amendment would be a
lengthy study in itself, and a review of that depth will not be attempted as a part of
this work.
Finally, some suggestions as to the prospective application of the amendment
will be made. These suggestions, like the analysis of the meaning of terms within
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the amendment and the amendment as a whole, will assume that the legislative and
voter intent with the amendment was to maintain the current state of the law.
At the outset, the author must admit to being a participant-observer during the
legislative and campaign history of the right-to-bear-arms amendment. Far from
being a neutral by stander in that process, I actively opposed the passage of
the amendment in my role as a member of the West Virginia House of Delegates,
and was active during the 1986 election campaign in opposition to passage of that
measure. Any author who finds himself quoting himself, or reviewing his own
legislative actions, does so only with great caution and with even greater notice to
the reader. Hopefully the insight into the legislative and campaign process that I
can offer, together with the caution I have exercised in my historical analysis, will
balance any natural suspicion raised in the mind of a reader of the account of an
author who was a participant in the very process he is reporting about as an
observer.
II.

A.

STATUTORY AND CASE LAW HISTORY:

1863-1986

Pre-license Law: 1863-1909

When the State of West Virginia was formed in 1863, it continued' an existing
Virginia statute classified under the title "For Preventing The Cpmmission of
Crimes."12 This statute stated that a recognizance bond "may be required" if a
"person go armed with a deadly or dangerous weapon." However, a self-defense
exception was included which allowed the carrying of such arms if an individual
had "reasonable cause to fear violence to his person, family or property." 3 This
statute was codified in West Virginia in 1868.'
In 1873, the statute was rewritten, 5 and the offense was redefined as
"habitually carrying about his person concealed weapons, such as dirks, bowie
knives, pistols or other dangerous weapons." The revised statute also deleted the
self-defense exception found in the earlier law. In addition, it was made the duty
of a justice of the peace to cause a person in violation of the statute to be arrested.
Rather than the earlier posting of a recognizance bond, the 1873 statute provided
for a criminal trial with a penalty upon conviction of a fine not to exceed the
sum of ten dollars.6 In an apparent effort to encourage enforcement of the statute,

'W.

VA. CONsr. of 1863, art. XI, § 8.

2 VA. CODE tit. 55, ch. CCI, § 8 (1860).

3 Id.
W. VA. CODE ch. 153, § 8 (1868) (APPENDIX A, infra at 1163).
5 1872-73 W. Va. Acts ch. 226, § 168 (APPENDIX B, infra at 1163).
6 Id.
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justices of the peace were made subject to a penalty if they willfully failed to enforce the provisions of the new law.7
The first appearance of a statute at all similar to the modern firearms statute
in the state was in 1882. The 1873 statute, found in chapter 153, section 8, was first
rewritten to require a recognizance bond in the event of a violation of a newly
drafted weapon statute. 8 This new statute9 prohibited the carrying by a person
"about his person" of a "dangerous or deadly" weapon, and made violation
of the statute a misdemeanor. Prohibited weapons were defined as "any revolver
or other pistol, dirk .... or any other dangerous or deadly weapon of like kind or

character... ."1o The statute directed an acquittal upon the finding by a jury that
the defendant was of good character and that he was acting in self-defense. Exemptions from the provisions of the 1882 firearms statute included the carrying of weapons by officers of the law and an exemption for the carrying of
weapons by an individual about one's "dwelling house or premises.""
Some hint of the cause for passage of this blanket prohibition against the
carrying of weapons is found in an examination of the criminal conspiracy laws
known as the "Red Men Acts," which were enacted under the same influences,
and included in the same legislative act, as the 1882 weapons statute. 2 State v.
Porter,an 1885 West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals decision, 3 noted that the
"public history and the exigencies, which led to the 1882 enactments are matters of
judicial cognizance.""' One such exigency which Porter alluded to was the existence "in certain counties of the State lawless bands of men, known as 'Red
Men', 'Regulators', 'Vigilance Committes', etc., who were in the habit of inflicting
punishment and bodily injury upon peaceful citizens, and injuring, carrying away
and destroying their property and committing other acts of trespass of the most
violent and outrageous character."'' 5 In a 1975 decision that declared the Red Men
Acts unconstitutional," the West Virginia court noted that the passage of the 1882
statute, which included both the Red Men Acts as well as the weapons statute,
was
7
a "desperate remedy" to combat that kind of threat to the public safety.'
Although the Red Men Acts and the weapons statute were codified in different

Id. at ch. 226, § 169.
I

"

1882 W. Va. Acts ch. 110, § 8.
Id. at ch. 135, § 7 (APPENDIX C, infra at 1164).
1882 W. Va. Acts ch. 135, § 7 (codified at W. VA. CODE

ch.

148, § 7 (1887)).

Id.
"
14

"

Id. at (9), (10), (12), & (13) (codified at W. VA. CODE ch. 148, § 7 (1887).
State v. Porter, 25 W. Va. 685 (1885).
Id. at 689.
Id.

Pinkerton v. Farr, 159 W. Va. 223, 220 S.E.2d 682 (1975). The court found that the presump,
tion of guilt of conspiracy created by the statute failed to establish a rational or reasonable connection
between the fact proved and the fact presumed. Id. at 223, 220 S.E.2d at 689.
1 Id. at 223, 220 S.E.2d at 689.
"
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articles of the Code in the 1931 recodification,' 8 their common birthplace in 1882
and their continuation in the same chapter of the Code from 1882 through 193119
suggests that the apparent strictness of the weapons statute, like the Red Men Acts,
was fully intended by the legislature. Because the 1882 statute contained the roots
of the modern West Virginia statute, its origin-as a statute apparently intended
to be a strict blanket prohibition of the carrying of weapons-is an important
historical factor in discussing weapons law in the twentieth century.
The 1882 statute was first addressed by the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals nine years after passage in State v. Workman,2" an opinion written by
Chief Justice Lucas and cited by the United States Supreme Court in United States
v. Miller as one of the "most important decisions" in the country in the field of second amendment analysis. 2' In Workmen, the West Virginia court addressed the
constitutional right to self-defense, the constitutionality of statutes such as the
1882 West Virginia statute under a second amendment analysis, and, finally, the
definition of the term "arms" in the second amendment phrase "keeping and
bearing of arms.

'

22

The Workman court first found that there was a constitutional right to selfdefense under both the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution 23 and article III, section 1 of the West Virginia Constitution, 24 and found further that this right was guaranteed to all persons, whether of
good character or not. 25 Although section 7 of 1882 statute26 appared to grant a selfdefense exception only to defendants of "good character," the court held that the
statute was constitutional because the granting of the statutory acquittal to those
of good character who established self-defense did not deprive those not21
establishing good character from advancing a self-defense defense to conviction.
In upholding the 1882 statute, the, court clearly supported the broad prohibition of carrying weapons found in that statute. In finding the presence of a
statutory presumption, the court stated that:
The presumption which the law establishes, that every man who goes armed in

the midst of a peaceable community is of vile character, and a criminal, is of con"SThe RED MEN AcTs were recodified in W. VA. CODE § 61-6-7 to -11 (1931) while the dangerous
weapon statutes were recodified in W. VA. CODE § 61-7-1 to -15 (1931).
29 W. VA. CODE ch. 148 (1887); W. VA. CODEc h. 148 (Barnes 1923).
20
22

State v. Workman, 35 W. Va. 367, 14 S.E. 9 (1891).
United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 182 (1939). See c.f. United States v. Adams, 11 F. Supp.

216, 219 (S.D. Fla. 1935); United States v. Tot, 28 F. Supp. 900, 903 (D.N.J. 1939); People v. Brown,
253 Mich. 537, 233 N.W. 245, 246 (1931); Carlton v. State, 63 Fla. 1, 8-9, 58 So. 486, 488 (1912).
22 Work-man, 35 W. Va. 367, 14 S.E. 9.
23 Id.
at 370-71, 14 S.E. at 10.
24

Id.

Id. at 370, 14 S.E. at 10.
1882 W. Va. Acts ch. 135, § 7.
1 Workman, 35 W. Va. at 370-71, 14 S.E. at 10.

22
26
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sonance with the common law, and is a perfectly just and proper presumption, and
one which ought to prevail in every community which aspires to be called
2
civilized. 1
Having found the statute constitutional despite its restrictive self-defense exception, the court next addressed the second amendment issues. Importantly, the
court addressed those issues as though the second amendment was a restriction
upon state legislation as well as federal legislation. 29 The court therefore interpreted the "keep and bear arms" language of the second amendment in a West
Virginia context. Such an interpretation was rendered moot by United States
Supreme Court decisions holding that the second amendment did not apply to the
states," but the court's analysis is now of particular interest with the passage of the
Right to Keep and Bear Arms amendment to the West Virginia Constitution in 1986.
The court first addressed the general intent of the second amendment, and
found it to be the protection of keeping and bearing arms as a popular (or collective) right.3 1 As a collective right, the court concluded that "by law to regulate a
conceded [constitutional] right is not to infringe the same. ' 3 2 In this context, the
court compared regulation of the constitutional right to bear arms to the regulation of first amendment freedom of speech and religion. 3 By doing so, the court
seemed to suggest that a specific constitutional right to keep and bear arms would
subject regulation of those protected weapons to the same scrutiny as laws
3 4
regulating freedom of speech or religion.
Id. at 371, 14 S.E. at 10-11.
11 "Supposing this [the second amendment] to be a restriction upon legislation by the several
states, as well as by the congress (a question upon which authorities differ) ...." Id. at 372, 14 S.E. at
11. Workman does not stand for the proposition that the second amendment extends to the states, but
is rather a decision assuming, but not holding, that the second amendment did apply to the states.
1oProminent in the decisions cited by W. Va. Attorney General Alfred Caldwell in arguing
Workman was United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875), which addressed the effect of the second amendment on the states in the following language: "The second amendment declares that it [the
right to keep and bear arms] shall not be infringed; but this, as has been seen, means no more than that
it shall not be infringed by Congress ...." Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 553.
Citing Cruikshank and other decisions, the United States Supreme Court unanimously held in
Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535 (1894) that it was "well settled" that the second amendment "operate[s]
only upon the Federal power, and [has] no reference whatever to proceedings in state courts." Miller,
153 U.S. at 538.
11 Workman, 35 W. Va. at 372-73, 14 S.E. at 11.
32 Id.
3 Id.
14Id. at 372, 14 S.E. at 11. This language suggests that the court would have applied such a
scrutiny to the West Virginia statute if it had found that handguns were constitutionally protected
weapons (see infra note 35 and accompanying text) and, if further, the second amendment was found to
apply to the states. The kind of scrutiny contemplated by the court in such a case might well be of the
type discussed in the CaroleneProductsfootnote (U.S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938)).
Justice Stone's footnote 4 to that decision (304 U.S. at 152) suggested strict scrutiny of statutes infringing upon a specific constitutional right. Although the Carolene Products footnote appeared long after
Workman, it does describe the kind of scrutiny the West Virginia court might have applied if the statute
had been found to impact on a specific constitutional right (in this case, the second amendment).
21
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Workman also addressed quite directly, in the context of the second amendment language, the definition of the term "arms." The court defined that term in
the following manner:
[I]n regard to the kind of arms referred to in the [second] amendment, it must
be held to refer to the weapons of warfare to be used by the militia, such as swords,
guns, rifles, and muskets-arms to be used in defending the State and civil liberty-and not to pistols, bowie knives, billies, and other weapons as are usually
employed in brawls, street fights, duels, and affrays, and are only habitually carried by bullies, blackguards, and desperadoes, to the terror of the community and
the injury of the state.3
With this definition, the court clearly refused to include handguns in the class of
constitutionally-protected weapons under the militia analysis of the second amendment language, apparently leaving the state free to regulate such weapons without
constitutional constraint even if second amendment language was found to apply
in the state constitutional context. But even further, the court seemed to read such
weapons out of any classification of weapons to be protected as personal or family
defense weapons.
Having dismissed handguns as constitutionally-protected weapons, the court
then addressed the circumstances that would support a self-defense claim under the
1882 statute. Citing its 1890 decision in State v. Barnett,36 the court described the
self-defense exception by stating:
It is not enough for the defendant to state or show by other witnesses the
general proposition that he had good cause to believe and did believe, that he was
in danger... A mere threat, standing isolated and alone, while admissible in
evidence in defense as an item of evidence, is not sufficient to establish good cause
on the part of the defendant to fear death or harm ....31
The defendant in Barnettwas a mall carrier who carried a pistol while transporting
mail. He was threatened by a resident named Scott who lived along a road that
Barnett regularly traveled while carrying the mail. The threats included attack by
Scott as well as attack by a "vicious and dangerous dog [owned by Scott], which
had frequently attacked defendant while [he was] passing along the road with said
mail."" The defendant offered evidence that he was of good character, and stated
that he carried "said revolver in self-defense, and for no other purpose what39
soever."
Those threats were found by the court to be "conditional and.., insufficient
to inspire any serious ground of fear," and the court found from the record that
3
36

Workman, 35 W. Va. at 373, 14 S.E. at 11.
State v. Barnett, 34 W. Va. 74, 11 S.E. 735 (1890).

31 Barnett,

34 W. Va. at 77, 11 S.E. at 736 (cited in Workman, 35 W. Va. at 374, 14 S.E. at

11-12).

1,Id. at 75, 11 S.E. at 735.
39 Id.
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"[n]ot a single act of violence or attempted violence on Scott's part appears.""
The court further held that no fear of injury from a dog justified carrying a
revolver under the self-defense exception to the 1882 statute, 41 reasoning that:
[A] mere conditional threat of violence by one person towards another, unaccompanied by any act or conduct on the part of the party making such threat evincing a design to do violence to the other person, will not justify the carrying of a
revolver, under section 7, c. 148, Code 1887.... If such were the ruling of the
courts, it would largely rob this useful statute of the beneficial effect it was in42
tended to accomplish in the preservation of life and the public peace.
The Workman and Barnett decisions addressed and resolved a number of
issues involving the right to self-defense, the right to bear arms, and the constitutional status of handguns in firearms regulation. Although this thread of analysis
was cut off through subsequent federal court decisions43 and state statutory
changes," two major points seem again to be of importance in the current discussion of the right-to-bear-arms amendment: the first being the constitutional treatment of right-to-bear-arms language suggested by Workman," and the second being the analysis of the right to self-defense seen in Workman and Barnett.4 ' Both
of these issues have become potentially relevant in current West Virginia constitutional analysis.
B.

Early License Law: 1909-1925

In 1909, the West Virginia Legislature abandoned the general prohibition
against carrying dangerous weapons ' and enacted the state's first weapon license
statute. Rewriting section 7 of chapter 148 of the Code, 48 the new statute declared
it a misdemeanor for any person, "without a state license therefor," to "carry
on or about his person, any revolver or other pistol, dirk, bowie knife, slung shot,
razor, billy, metallic or other false knuckles, or any other dangerous or deadly
' 49
weapon of like kind or character.
The only exceptions to the requirement for a license to carry such a weapon
were found in allowing the carrying of a weapon "in good faith and not for a
felonious purpose, upon [one's] own premises," and other exceptions for law enforcement and weapon repair. There was no self-defense exception to the license
requirement."
" Id. at 77, 11 S.E. at 736.
Id.

41

Id. at 77-78, 11 S.E. at 736.
See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
44 As will be discussed infra, 1909 legislation (1909 W. Va. Acts ch. 51, §
7) abolished the selfdefense exception in favor of a permit system; see infra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
42

"

41

See supra note 35 and accompanying text.

" See supra notes 38-42 and
41 1882 W. Va. Acts ch. 135,
" W. VA. CODE ch. 148, § 7
"' 1909 W. Va. Acts ch. 51,
50Id.

accompanying text.
§ 7 (codified at W. VA. CODE ch. 148, § 7 (1887)).
(1887) (W. VA. CODE ch. 148, § 4338 (West 1906)).
§ 7 (APPENDIX D, infra at 1164).
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The 1909 legislative intent to enact and enforce a strict license law could be
seen not only in the few exceptions to the license requirement, but also in the
amount of the bond required before a license could be issued. Set at the amount of
$3,500 by specific amendment on the floor of the state senate on January 27,2
1909,51 that amount is comparable to a bond of nearly $40,000 at present values.1
The requirements to gain a license were also demanding. An individual seeking
a license was required to apply to the circuit court of the county of his residence
after publication of his intent to do so. The applicant had the burden of proving
his qualifications for the license, which included being twenty-one years of age or
older, of good moral and sober character, and having never been convicted of a
felony or a weapons offense. If the applicant was able to meet the minimum requirements, and then satisfy the circuit court that there was "good reason and
cause for carrying such weapon," the license would be issued only after payment
3
of fees, posting of the required bond, and meeting other such conditions.1
The legislative intent to ensure enforcement of the statute could be seen in the
imposition of penalties upon any "ministerial officer" who willfully failed to
report the names of violators of the weapons law, including possible fine and
removal from office, and the penalty of a fine of up to one hundred dollars for
any person who had knowledge of a violation but failed to
both report the crime
5 4
and "freely and fully give evidence concerning the same." 1
The purpose of the 1909 statute was examined in two West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals decisions in the early 1920s. The first, State v. Blazovitch,5 involved "a single purely legal question, one of interpretation of the basic provision
of section 7 of chapter 148 of the Code . .',
Applying a rule of strict construction to the "highly penal" statute in a case dealing with the presence of a loaded
revolver in a piece of luggage carried by the convicted defendant, the court found
that such a statute embraces only what comes within both the spirit and the letter
57
of that statute.
In a definitive statement of the purpose of the 1909 statute, the court held:
The manifest purpose of the statute is prevention of the carrying of deadly

" Amendment to Substitute for Senate Bill 34, January 27, 1909, by floor action in West
Virginia Senate. SENATE J. 183 (1909). The same bond amount was required to be posted by those permitted to carry the included weapons without a license by floor amendment in the West Virginia House
of Delegates on February 11, 1909. HOUSE J. 366 (1909).
,1 At a 3 %discount rate, the present value of $3,500 in 1909 would be just over $36,000 in 1987.
The current bond required for a license to carry a weapon under W. VA. CODE § 61-7-2 (1984) is
$5,000, which, if discounted to 1909 value at the same discount rate of 3 '70,would be comparable to a
bond of just over $480 in 1909.
11 1909 W. Va. Acts ch. 51, § 7.
34 Id.
" State v. Blazovitch, 88 W. Va. 612, 107 S.E. 291 (1921).
" 1909 W. Va. Acts ch. 51, § 7 (codified at W. VA. CODE ch. 148, § 7 (West Supp. 1909)).
Blazovitch, 88 W. Va. at 613, 107 S.E. at 291.
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weapons, to the end that the temptation and power to employ them in assaults
upon human beings, prompted by anger or evil design, may be thwarted, and

citizens freed from the terror the brandishment thereof inspires and their lives and
limbs preserved. Prevention of injury by careless or negligent use of pistols, or accidental discharge thereof, is within the plain purpose of the statute....

To hold that the legislative purpose is limited to prevention of the use of such
weapons, only in the case of a quarrel or combat, would give the statute a narrowness of scope and operation not indicated by any of its terms. The generality of
its terms impliedly forbids such restriction. It is no respector of persons. All
citizens, except peace officers, are within its terms, women as well as men,

peaceable persons as well as quarrelsome, the honest man as well as the thief,
burglar, robber and murderer. Restraint of all evil wrought by the use of deadly
weapons is clearly within its purpose. Prevention of stealthy robbery, and murder

effected by such means is as much within its scope as unlawful injury or homicide
wrought in heat of blood, or inflicted by negligence or accident."

The purpose of that statute also was examined the following year in State V.
Kinney." In a decision dealing with the exception found in the 1909 statute allowing an unloaded pistol or revolver to be carried by a person "from the place of
purchase to his home or place of residence or a place of repair and back to his
home or residence.

... 6o the court found that "[s]tatutes of this nature are

designed to suppress the habit of going about armed ready for offense or defense
in case of conflict with another .... "6 The court also noted that the exception for
transport of an unloaded weapon "was designed to take from the weapon its
possibility as an instrument of offensive or defensive combat while the purchaser
was on premises not his own; such as the highway [or other places] where other
persons had the right to be." 62 While reversing the verdict against the defendant in
Kinney, the court restated the policy of the state that "[t]he rigid enforcement of
the statute against carrying dangerous weapons should not be relaxed, and it is not
our purpose to do so...
It is clear from Blazovitch and Kinney that the West Virginia court continued
its support of strict weapons regulation into the 1920s. In finding the absence of
any right to offensive or defensive use, or possession for any reason outside the
statutory exceptions, of revolvers, pistols, or other deadly or dangerous weapons
of like kind or character away from a person's own premises without a state
license, the court continued the established state policy as seen in Workman.'

Id. at 614-15, 107 S.E. at 292.
State v. Kinney, 92 W. Va. 272, 114 S.E. 677 (1922).
W. VA. CODE ch. 148, § 7 (West Supp. 1909).
6W
Kinney, 92 W. Va. at 275, 114 S.E. at 678.
62 Id.
61Id. at 276, 114 S.E. at 678.
64 See discussion of Workman supra notes 20-35 and accompanying text.
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The 1909 statute, like earlier statutes, did not address whether rifles, shotguns,
and other "long-guns" were included in the phrase "or any dangerous or deadly
weapon of like kind or character." 6 The phrase "like kind or character" was
defined in State v. Lett," a 1908 decision not directly addressing the inclusion of
long-guns in such language, as those weapons like the weapons enumerated in the
Code "in the respect that they are dangerous or deadly. ' 67 The Lett test, if applied
to long-guns, would seem to have included such weapons with a test of effect of
the weapon, rather than size or shape.
A 1918 opinion of Attorney General E.T. England,68 given in response to an
inquiry about the arming of industrial plant guards with Winchester high powered
rifles, suggested that the criteria set out in Lett was only "one element in arriving
at the fact of ascertaining as to what the legislature meant to include" by the
phrase "of like kind and character." The opinion stated that an additional test was
whether the weapons "resemble in some respect the kind of weapons specifically
mentioned in the statute." 69 England concluded that in order for a weapon to be
included in the dangerous weapon statute,70 the weapon had to meet what
amounted to a two-part test: first, it had to be dangerous and deadly in its effects,
and second, it had to physically resemble one of the enumerated weapons to the
extent that it was "of such kind and character that it may be easily concealed
about the person."' Given this test, England concluded that he was "of the opinion that it is not necessary to obtain a state license [under the 1909 statute] in
'1 2
order to entitle one to legally carry about his person a Winchester rifle.
The England interpretation, rather than the reasoning of Lett, was apparently
the one accepted by the state government. Governor Ephriam F. Morgan, in his
1923 "Governor's Message" to the legislature, 73 called for the expansion of the
coverage of what he termed "our stringent law against 'pistol toting' to include
The 1860 Virginia Code (VA. CODE tit. 55, ch. CCI, § 8) continued in West Virginia by W. VA.
1863 (art. XI, § 8) addressed the general category of "a deadly or dangerous weapon" (see
supra note 2 and accompanying text). The 1873 statute (1872-73 W. Va. Acts ch. 226, § 168) addressed
"concealed weapons, such as ...pistols or other dangerous weapons") (see supra notes 5, 6 and accompanying text). Both the 1882 statute and 1909 statutes addressed "any revolver or other pistol...
or other dangerous or deadly weapon of like kind and character" (see supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text).
" State v. Lett, 63 W. Va. 665, 60 S.E. 782 (1908).
67 Id. at 666, 60 S.E. at 782. Lett dealt with the question of the inclusion of a "blackjack" in the
1882 statute.
6, 28 Op. Att'y Gen. 18 (W.Va. 1918).
69 Id. at 19.
,o1909 W. Va. Acts ch. 51, § 7 (codified at W. VA. CODE ch. 148, § 7 (West Supp. 1909)).
7 28 Op. Att'y Gen. at 19.
72 Id.
71 Governor's Message to the Legislature, HOUSE J. (Jan. 10, 1923). The previous Governor,
John J.Cornwell, had commented on the "tendency on the part of so many persons to violate the laws
of the State, such as prohibition, gambling and pistol-carrying statutes ....'in his biennial message to
the Legislature on January 13, 1921. See 1921 SENATE J. Appendix A, 33. Howard B. Lee, Attorney
General of West Virginia, commented in BLOODLETrING IN APPALACHIA, that no permit was required
"

CONST. of
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"high-powered rifles." 7 4 In the same message, framed against the background of
the ongoing "mine wars" in the state during the period, 7 the Governor called for
stronger enforcement of existing weapons statutes (the 1909 statute), restrictions
on possession of a pistol or revolver by "aliens and persons who have been convicted of [a] felony," restrictions on sales of pistols and revolvers, and a record
76
keeping requirement for all sales of pistols.
Although the legislature did not respond to his 1923 request, Governor
Morgan repeated his call for stronger weapons statutes in a subsequent message to
the legislature. In his 1925 message, 7 7 Governor Morgan requested the passage of
"more stringent laws relative to the exhibition, sale, purchase and carrying of
revolvers and high powered rifles, [noting that] promiscuous carrying of fire
arms, and frequent shooting affrays and murders... mar the peace and happiness
and endanger the lives of peaceful citizens....
The legislature responded to Governor Morgan's request in the 1925 regular
session by actually weakening the 1909 statute. Additional exemptions to the requirement for a license were added to the Code, the maximum penalty for carrying
without a license was reduced, and the provision requiring any person with
knowledge of a violation of the statute to report the same was deleted. 7 9 But those
revisions to the statute, for the most part, were to be short-lived. With the urging
of new Governor Howard M. Gore, who took office in 1925,80 an extraordinary
session of the 1925 legislature would enact a modern license statute very similar to
that requested by Governor Morgan.
C.

The Modern License Law: From 1925 to the Present

In his call for the first extraordinary session of the 1925 legislature, Governor
Howard M. Gore included the subject of "regulating persons authorized to carry
arms." 81 Except for the additional exceptions to the license requirement, all of the
1925 regular session amendments were rescinded during the extraordinary
session."
for carrying a high powered rifle as of May 19, 1920 (the date of what is known as the "Matewan
Massacre" in Mingo County, West Virginia). BLOODLETrING IN APPALACHIA, 53 (1969).
7, Governor's Message to the Legislature, HousE J. 49 Appendix A (Jan. 10, 1923).
7 Id. at 12-16 (discussed by Governor Morgan).
76 Id. Governor Morgan was proposing modeling the West Virginia statute after a proposed
uniform act.
"1Governor's Message to the Legislature, HousE J. 1 Appendix A (Jan. 14, 1925).
71 Id. at 27.
71 1925 W. Va. Acts, ch. 95, § 7 (apparently never codified).
10 Governor Gore took office on Mar. 4, 1925, pursuant to W. VA. CONST. of 1872, art. VII, § 1
(repealed 1934).
" Proclamation by Governor Howard M. Gore, HousE J. (Apr. 27, 1925) (Ist Extraordinary
Sess.).
, 1925 W. Va. Acts ch. 3, § 7 (1st Extraordinary Sess.) (c6dified at W. VA. COD ch. 148, § 7
(Barnes Supp. 1925)) (APPENDIX E, infra at 1167).
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In addition to restoration of the amended provisions to their pre-1925
language, the extraordinary session rewrote and generally strengthened the law in
much the fashion urged by Governor Morgan in 1923. Some of the amendments
included:
(1) requirements for United States citizenship and state and county residence
for license applicants;
(2) restriction of the effect of an issued license to designated counties;
(3) the doubling of the application fee for a license fee from ten to twenty
dollars;
(4) a general prohibition against employees carrying weapons without a license
on the premises of their employer (including a corporate employer), with specific
exceptions for express company and railroad police employees under bond of their
employer;
(5) a new paragraph declaring it a misdemeanor to "carry, expose, brandish,
or use" a licensed or unlicensed weapon "in a way or manner to cause, or
threaten, a breach of the peace";
(6) a prohibition of ownership or possession of a firearm "of any kind or
character" by an alien, and making it illegal to "sell, rent, give or lend" such a
firearm to an unnaturalized person;
(7) making it unlawful to publicly display "to passersby in the streets" any
firearm or ammunition; and
(8) requiring
record keeping upon the sale of any of the "foregoing arms or
83
weapons."
A new subsection (b) was also added to section 7 of the 1909 statute so that the
possession of "any machine gun, sub-machine gun, and what is commonly known
as a high powered rifle, or any gun of similar kind or character, or any ammunition therefor. . ." was included in the prohibition of carrying weapons without a
license.14 This new prohibition included exemptions for rifle club members' use of
such weapons for practice and "actual hunting" pursuant to the conditions of a
state hunting license. 85
In the general recodification of 1931, chapter 148, section 7(a) and (b), as
amended in 1925, were recodified in article 7 of chapter 61 . 86 With the 1925
amendments and the 1931 recodification, the West Virginia weapon statute took
on much of its current character. As has been seen, the development of the law has
been one of increasing strictness in terms of carrying weapons away from one's
premises, with neither handguns nor long guns being permitted to be carried off

'

Id. at § 7(a).

"

Id. at § 7(b).

S$

Id.
WV. VA. CODE ch. 148, § 7(a) (recodified in W. VA. CODE § 61-7-1 to -6 (1931)). W. VA. CODE

ch. 148, § 7(b) (recodified in W. VA. CODE § 61-7-7 to -10 (1931)).
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one's premise without either a weapon license, a hunting license, or a statutory exemption from the license statute.
A further look at the criteria for inclusion of a weapon not specified in the
statute as a "dangerous or deadly" weapon was seen in Barboursvillev. Taylor in
1934.17 In Barboursville, the court appeared to reaffirm the reasoning of Lett"
that suggested an "effects" test for inclusion of nonenumerated weapons. That
"effects" test of Lett, of course, was in contrast to that suggested by Attorney
General England in his 1918 Attorney General Opinion, 8 9 which suggested a twopart test requiring both dangerous and deadly effects and similiarity in size and
shape for inclusion of such a nonenumerated weapon. That two-part test was implicitly recognized by the governor and legislature during the 1923-25 period,
resulting in the specific inclusion of rifles and other long-guns in the statute in
1925.90
The Barboursville court, returning to a Lett-type analysis, 91 found that the
statute relating to the carrying of dangerous or deadly weapons" was designed "to
proscribe the carrying about the person of such instruments as are dangerous per
se-inherently, intrinsically, characteristically."'"3 Dividing such objects which
might be included in the statutory regulation into two classes, the court held that
"articles intended as weapons," but not specified in the statute, would be
"dangerous or deadly within the statutory meaning if in its intended or readily
adaptable use it is likely to produce death or serious bodily injury."' 4 Under such
reasoning, the 1925 amendment including machine guns, rifles, and the like"
would have been unnecessary, since a Lett-Barboursville analysis would have included such weapons in the former statute because of both their per se nature as
dangerous weapons (the Barboursvilleclassification) as well as their dangerous and
deadly effects (a Lett effects test).
It should be noted, however, that Barboursville did not address the prosecution of a long-gun violation under West Virginia Code section 61-7-8. 9 The
"weapon" in question in that decision was an easily concealable "fountain pen
tear gas gun"'97 that would have certainly satisfied the 1918 Attorney General's
Opinion concealability criteria.'8 Because neither Lett nor Barboursville directly
Barboursville ex rel. Bates v. Taylor, 115 W. Va. 4, 174 S.E. 485 (1934).
"
"
"
"

"
"

See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 73-82 and accompanying text.
Though not citing Left by name.
WZVA. CODE § 61-7-1 (1931).
W.
Barboursville, 115 W. Va. at 7, 174 S.E. at 487.

Id. at 7-8, 174 S.E. at 487.
1925 W. Va. Acts ch. 3, § 7(b) (Ist Extraordinary Sess.) (codified at W. VA. CODE § 61-7-8

(1931)).

W. VA. CODE § 61-7-8 (1931).
Barboursville, 115 W. Va. at 7, 174 S.E. at 486.
" See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
"
"
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addressed the issue of concealability as a criterion for inclusion of long-guns with
pistols, revolvers, and other such weapons, that distinction recognized in passage
of the 1925 amendments likely remains a valid theoretical one.
That theoretical distinction is important. Since Workman, the state seemed to
recognize a basic distinction between pistol-type, easily concealable weapons and
long-gun-type weapons that were not easily concealable. It was just such a distinction between pistols, revolvers, and other concealable weapons as constitutionally
unprotected weapons, and other not-easily-concealed (impliedly long-gun) weapons
9
as constitutionally protected weapons, that was made in the Workman analysis.
That same distinction continues to this day in the statutes of the state in sections 1
and 8 of article 7 of chapter 61 of the Code.
Furthermore, the language of section 7(b) of chapter 3, Acts of 1925,1" clearly
indicates that the 1925 legislature understood rifles and long-guns to be excluded
from the provisions of the pre-1925 license statute. 10' The 1925 amendment, adding section 7(b) to chapter 148, spoke of obtaining a license "as in the case of
revolvers and pistols." ' 2 Inclusion of such language clearly implied that the existing statute was understood not to include the specific weapons, and the general
class of not-easily-concealed weapons, brought under Code regulation by the 1925
amendments.
With the adoption of the 1925 amendments, either a Lett-Barboursville
analysis, or an analysis based on the two-part test suggested in the 1918 Attorney
General Opinion and apparently recognized in the passage of the 1925 amendments, would lead to the conclusion that all firearms were now included in the
strict carrying license law developed in West Virginia between 1909 and 1925. The
effect of this development was to prohibit the carrying, away from one's own
premises, any type of firearm for any reason not specified as an exception in the
Code without a license.
Such a reason might be self-defense, a constitutional right recognized by the
Workman court."0 3 But did that right include the right to armed self-defense, and
what would the court determine to be the balance between the recognized right to
self-defense and the developed general prohibition against the carrying of any
firearm for any reason other than with a license or for a statutorily specified
reason?
0 4
of
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals addressed the 1909 repeal'
the self-defense exception to the West Virginia carrying statute that had existed in

"

See supra note 35 and accompanying text.

1925 W. Va. Acts ch. 3, § 7(b) (1st Extraordinary Sess.) (codified at W. VA. CODE ch. 148, § 7
(West. Supp. 1925)).
'' W. VA. CODE ch. 148, § 7 (Barnes 1923).
202 1925 W. Va. Acts ch. 3, § 7(b) (1st Extraordinary Sess.).
"' See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
1o,1909 W. Va. Acts ch. 51, § 7.
200
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the law either explicitly or implicitly since the formation of the state"' in State v.
Merico,'0 6 a 1915 decision. In Merico, the court held that no person had a legal
right to carry a pistol even if he feared that someone "would attack him and do
him great bodily injury.' '1 0 7 Even in the face of a threat that would appear to
satisfy the standards established in Workman and Barnett to support a self-defense
defense under the pre-1909 Code,'0 8 the court concluded that "[t]he present statute
[the 1909 statute] makes no such [self-defense] exception."' 0 9 But Merico addressed the self-defense question when only pistols and revolvers, and not long-guns,
were regulated. With the 1925 amendments"I 0 and the broad interpretation in Barboursville of what was included in such statutes,' all firearms were regulated
when carried off one's own premises. The question then arose as to whether there
was any right to armed self-defense despite the provisions of the strict carrying
laws.
The West Virginia court addressed this in 1945 in State v. Foley." 2 Defendant
Foley had shot and killed a certain Joe Groves with a revolver"' carried by Foley
without a license to do so under state law.' " Foley claimed self-defense against a
charge of homicide and, upon conviction, assigned error to his being required to
answer questions on cross-examination as to whether or not he had a state license
for the revolver." '
The court held that a defendant in such a matter waives the privilege against
self-incrimination by voluntarily taking the witness stand only as to the matters
relevant to the issue. Finding that "[w]hether Foley had a license to carry a pistol
on the occasion he was armed is not relevant in the least to the common law right
to arm for self-defense,"" ' the court found reversible error
in the "questions pro17
prosecution."
the
by
elicited"
answers
the
and
pounded
While finding the license law irrelevant to the right of self-defense, the court
did rule that the exercise of that right with a weapon did not preclude prosecution
under the misdemeanor license law. The court noted that "the right to arm for
"I Both the 1860 Virginia statute (VA. CODE tit. 55, ch. CCI, § 8) and the 1882 West Virginia

statute (1882 W. Va. Acts ch. 135, § 7) included specific self-defense defenses. The 1873 West Virginia
statute (1872-73 W. Va. Acts ch. 226, § 168) implied such a defense by addressing only the "habitual"

carrying of a weapon.
206 State v. Merico, 77 W. Va. 314, 87 S.E. 370 (1915).
107 Id. at 316, 87 S.E. at 371.
See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
109Merico, 77 W. Va. at 316, 87 S.E. at 371.
20,

220

1925 W. Va. Acts ch. 3, § 7 (1st Extraordinary Sess.).

222

See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.

22,

State v. Foley, 128 W. Va. 166, 35 S.E.2d 854 (1945).
Id. at 167, 35 S.E.2d at 855.
Id. at 176, 35 S.E.2d at 859.
Id. at 178, 35 S.E.2d at 860.
Id. at 181, 35 S.E.2d at 861.

117

Id. at 183, 35 S.E.2d at 862.

"1
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self-defense is distinct from a license to carry a pistol under Code, 61-7-1," and
held that the misdemeanor conviction that would result from carrying without a
license under that statute would not be precluded by the carrying of the weapon
for legitimate self-defense purposes."18
The balance reached by the court between the recognized right of self-defense
and the provisions of the license statute were summarized by Judge Fox in his concurring opinion. He noted:
The carrying of a pistol without a state permit is, in itself, a crime, for which
the statute provides a punishment; but, notwithstanding this, a person in fear from
knowledge of threats of death or great bodily harm, may, without a license choose
to arm himself with a pistol and take the risk of punishment, and if, later, he has

justifiable cause to use that pistol in his defense and commits homicide, I do not
believe the fact that he carried the pistol used therein without a license, is proper

testimony to go to a jury in a trial of a charge growing out of its use." 9
Although Foley, like Merrico, did not address a long-gun violation of the
statute, the reasoning of Foley would seem to clearly extend to the use in selfdefense of any firearm carried in violation of the license statute. While recognizing
the right to self-defense, the court refused to recognize a right to armed selfdefense. The license law would remain effective against even a person exercising
the right to self-defense: Workman's constitutional right of self-defense would exist apart from the state's right to regulate the carrying of firearms.
With the 1931 recodification and the decision in Foley, the field of firearms
regulation in West Virginia continued into the 1980s with little statutory activity in
substantive areas. Other than several relatively minor amendments made to the
weapons statute in 1975,120 and a state law precluding any municipal ordinance
prohibiting the ownership of firearms or ammunition passed in 1984,21 no further
statutory action occurred until the passage of the right-to-bear-arms amendment
by the legislature in 1985 and by the voters in 1986.
III.

A.

THEu RiGHT-To-BEAR-ARMs AmENDMENT

Legislative History: 1985

The "Right to Keep and Bear Arms Amendment" to the West Virginia Constitution was introduced in the House of Delegates on February 21, 1985, by
Delegates J. Martin and W. Carmichael as House Joint Resolution No. 18.122 It

Id. at 181, 35 S.E.2d at 861-62 (quoting F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 452).
Id. at 187-88, 35 S.E.2d at 864 (Fox J., concurring).
1101975 W. Va. Acts ch. 213 (codified at W. VA. CODE § 61-7-2 (1984)) (APPENDIX F, infra at
1173).
"'

W. VA. CODE § 61-7-8 (1984).
122For text see APPENDIX G, infra at 1175..
"
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was referred to the House Committee on Constitutional Revision,' which was
chaired by Delegate J. Humphreys.1 24 That committee considered House Joint
Resolution 18 on March 15.125 According to the abstract prepared for the committee's use, the resolution did "not appear to restrict the authority of the legislature
to enact laws regulating the use of arms when it is in the interest of public safety
and does not frustrate the guarantees of the constitutional provision."'2 6
Although formal analysis of the resolution was apparently not recorded in
legislative records, one detailed analysis was received by the Speaker of the House
on March 7, 1985, in the form of a letter with an attached paper entitled
"ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED WEST VIRGINIA CONSTITUTIONAL
GUARANTEE TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS." '' 27 The letter purported to "lay to
rest your [i.e., Speaker Joseph P. Albright's] concern about the state's ability to
keep firearms from the hands of criminals, minors, and the mentally infirmed."''
The analysis attached to the letter was apparently one circulated within the
legislative process to some degree. A search of committee and other records indicated that an additional copy of the same analysis was also made available
through the National Rifle Association's West Virginia State Liasion.'2 9 That
analysis, however, was not circulated to the membership of the House of
Delegates.
That analysis described the amendment as one that "explicitly protects the
traditional lawful rights that gun owners assumed were guaranteed in West
Virginia.""'3 That interpretation of the amendment as merely constitutionalizing
those existing lawful rights of gun owners in West Virginia was further supported
in the body of the analysis. The analysis discusses the bearing of constitutionallyprotected arms by first stating that such arms "may be regulated." It indicates
that concealed carrying statutes and statutes prohibiting open carrying "for an
unlawful purpose" would be upheld if the proposed amendment were adopted,
and specifically notes that "[a] license may be required to carry a pistol away from
one's home, place of business, or land."' 3'

"1 1985 HousE J., 216 (Feb. 21, 1985).
124 Id. at [xi].

No committee minutes. Interview with Chairman Humphreys (Jan. 29, 1987).
Abstract of H.J.R. No. 18 (Appendix G, infra at 1175) (prepared by Jon Snyder, Counsel to
House Committee on Constitutional Revisions).
12, Letter from Phil Burns, West Virginia State Rifle & Pistol Association, to Joseph P. Albright,
Speaker of the W. Va. House of Delegates (Mar. 6, 1985) (For text of ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED WEST
VmoMA CONSTnTUTONAL GUA.ANE To ICEaP AND BFa AS, see APPENDIX H, infra at 1176
(ANALYsIs).
12,
126

12, Id.

29 A

copy of that analysis was found in legislative files on H.J.R. No. 18 with an attached
business card of Charles H. Cunningham, West Virginia State Liaison of the Nat'l Rifle Ass'n.
"1o ANALYsIs, supra note 127, at Appendix H, infra at 1176.
31 Id.
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The analysis could be summarized as describing the proposed amendment as
one protecting the right to keep and bear arms as it currently existed in West
Virginia law, including in the definition of "arms". "only such arms as are commonly kept by the people, [including] the rifle, shotgun, and pistol."' 32 The term
"person" was defined so as to "guarantee an individual right" while excluding "a
person in a high risk category," and, as was discussed previously, the phrase
"keep and bear arms" was interpreted specifically not to preclude a license law
such as the one in West Virginia. The analysis concluded that "[tihis legislative
history indicates that the legislature is left with the power to deal effectively with
criminal misconduct. On the other hand, it [the amendment] would prevent the de' 33
cent people of this state from being disarnied.'
House Joint Resolution 18 was reported to the floor of the house on March 18
with recommendation that it pass without amendment."' As introduced and
reported, the proposed constitutional language was a new section of article III of
that constitution, to read as follows: "[s]ection 22: A person has the right to keep
and bear arms for the defense of self, family, home and state, and for lawful hunt' 135
ing and recreational use.'
Read a first time on March 19,136 the resolution was placed on amendment
stage, or second reading, on March 20.137 It was there amended by motion of
Delegate J. McNeely, upon a voice vote of the house, by insertion of the word
"lawful" in the resolution just preceding the word "defense," making the
amended resolution read: "[s]ection 22: A person has the right to keep and bear
arms for the lawful defense
of self, family, home and state, and for lawful hunting
38
and recreational use."'
The amended resolution was placed on third reading, or passage stage, on
March 21. Delegate T. Knight successfully sought unanimous consent of the house
to offer an amendment at that time that would have made the constitutional right
to bear arms specifically subject to the general police power of the state. Knight
then moved to return the resolution to second reading for amendment, but his motion
failed by a recorded vote of seventy-six to twenty-two. 39
House Joint Resolution 18, as amended, then passed the house by a vote of
ninety-one to seven, " with more than the constitutionally required two-thirds of

13 Id.
133 Id.
"'
26

HousE J. 515 (Mar. 18, 1985).
H.J.R. No. 18 as introduced and reported to floor.
HousE J. 567 (Mar. 19, 1985).

" Id. at 583 (Mar. 20, 1985).
"3

Id. at 583-84 (emphasis by author).

"I Id. at 599.600 (Mar. 21, 1985). Interview with Delegate T. Knight (January 29, 1987). Because

Delegate Knight's amendment was not formally presented to the house, its contents were not recorded.
140 Id.
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the members elected to the house voting in favor of the measure.' 4 There was no
comments by members or vote explanations recorded in the House Journal upon
passage of the resolution. According to a press account of the passage of the
resolution in the house, the amendment was intended to "prevent municipalities
from passing ordinances to ban handguns.' 4 ,2 According to the same account,
however, the Knight attempt to return the resolution to amendment stage was intended to "reword it to make sure that gun control laws such as pistol permit requirements and a prohibition against convicted felons having a gun would not be
4
nullified."11
House approval of House Joint Resolution 18 was communicated to the West
Virginia Senate on March 22, and the resolution was referred to the Senate Committee on Judiciary, chaired by Senator H.T. Chafin.'" That committee considered the resolution on April 2nd. After defeating a motion by Senator M.
Palumbo to delay action on the measure "in order for additional information to
be gathered," the committee adopted an amendment by Senator White to strike
the word "lawful" amended to the resolution by the house on March 20. A motion
by Senator T. Whitlow to report the resolution to the floor with the recommendation that it pass with amendment was then adopted without recorded dissent.' 5
The resolution was then reported to the floor of the senate on April 2 with the
recommended amendment, and with the recommendation that the resolution do
pass with amendment.' 46 Read a first time on April 3,141 House Joint Resolution 18
was placed on second reading for amendment on April 4.141 The recommended
Judiciary Committee amendment to strike the word "lawful" inserted in the
resolution by house amendment' 49 was adopted on voice vote.' 0
Senator Palumbo moved to amend the resolution by striking the first word of
the proposed section and inserting in lieu thereof the following phrase: "[s]ubject
only to the police power, a well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of
a free state, a .

.

."

'

That amendment was rejected by a recorded vote of

twenty-nine to four, and the resolution ordered to passage stage.'1 2 House Joint
Resolution 18, in its original form as introduced in the house, was approved by the
53
senate on April 5 by a vote of thirty-two to two.'
141 W.
342

VA. CONST., art. XIV, §

2.

Charleston Gazette, Mar. 22, 1985, § B, at 6, col. 3.

143 Id.
" 1985

SENATE J. 606 (Mar. 22, 1985).
Minutes, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary 2 (Apr. 2, 1985) (unpublished but available in the office of Clerk of West Virginia Senate, Charleston, W. Va.).
,46 SENATE J. 828 (Apr. 2, 1985).
US

1,, Id. at 878 (Apr. 3, 1985).

14 Id. 910 (Apr. 4, 1985).
141 Id. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
15* SENATE J. at 910 (Apr. 4, 1985).
1 Id.
M Id. at 910-11.
,13 Id. at 946-47 (Apr. 5, 1985).
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Senator Palumbo, who voted in opposition to passage of House Joint Resolution 181s' after unsuccessfully attempting to amend it on April 4, ' filed a written
vote explanation which was, at his request, inserted into the Appendix to the
Senate Journal.' Senator Palumbo's explanation was as follows:
MR. PALUMBO: I support the right of an individual to bear arms. However,
that is not the issue with House Joint Resolution No. 18. The issue with House
Joint Resolution No. 18 and why I voted "No" is because of my strong belief that
the right of an individual to bear arms should not be superior to the State's obligation to protect its people under its police power and through its National Guard
forces. In my opinion, House Joint Resolution No. 18 will cast considerable doubt
on whether the State's police power and National Guard forces will continue to be
superior to an individual's right to bear arms. This doubt could result in chaotic
events occurring in our State."5 7
A press account of the senate passage of the amended resolution described
Senator Palumbo's unsuccessful attempt to amend the resolution on April 4, and
then commented that "[tihe arms amendment, sought by the National Rifle
Association and other opponents of gun control, would place in the State constitution an amendment similar to the one in the Federal Bill of Rights which gives
5
,,"
citizens the right to keep and bear arms .
House Joint Resolution 18, as passed by the senate, was communicated to the
house on April 8. The house refused to concur in the senate amendment deleting
the word "lawful," and requested that the senate recede from that amendment." 9
The senate then refused to recede from its amendment and requested that the
house agree to appointment of a conference committee to resolve the difference
between the house and senate versions of the resolution. Senate President D.
Tonkovich appointed Senators Chafin, J.R. Rogers, and M. Shaw as senate
members of that committee.'16
Upon receipt of that senate request on April 9, the house agreed to the appointment of the conference committee. House Speaker Albright appointed
Delegates Humphreys, J. Martin and Carmichael as the house members of that
committee.1 6 The sponsor of the amendment adopted by the House on March 20,
was not included on that committee. 62
The conference committee agreed to delete the house amendment inserting the

'

Id. at 946.
Id. at 910 (Apr. 4, 1985).

"I

Id. at 947 (Apr. 5, 1985).

"s

1985 SENATE J. 2638 Appendix.
Charleston Gazette, Apr. 6, 1985, § A, at 1, col. 4.
'" House J. 1010-11 (Apr. 8, 1985).
6o SENATE J. 1052 (Apr. 8, 1985).
"' HousE J.1152-53 (Apr. 9, 1985).
"'

62See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
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word "lawful" preceding the word "defense," thereby restoring House Joint
Resolution 18 to its language as introduced. That report and the resolution were
approved by the house on April 12. The vote on final passage of House Joint
Resolution 18 in the house was ninety-two to six in favor of its passage.'" 3 The
senate approved the report later the same day, and then approved final passage of
House Joint Resolution 18 in that body by a vote of thirty-one to three.' 6
As has been seen, the legislative history of House Joint Resolution 18 is a
sketchy one. What can be seen is a consistent position by proponents that the
resolution would not affect existing gun control laws in the state, scattered attempts by opponents of the measure to amend it to include protection of those existing laws by specific reference in the resolution, and press treatment of the
resolution as one making no major change in West Virginia statutes.
B.

Campaign History: 1986

House Joint Resolution 18, as adopted, placed the Right to Keep and Bear
Arms Amendment on the ballot of the general election to be held on November 4,
1986.165 The campaign for passage of the amendment, designated "Amendment
No. 1' by the resolution,' 66 included a mass mailing of a National Rifle Association letter encouraging readers to support the passage of Amendment No. 1.'7 The
passage of the amendment was described in that letter' as "forever securing the
right to keep and bear arms in West Virginia.' ' "MThe letter indicated that the state
"has a proud heritage of respect for firearms ownership and sports hunting," and
noted that "in recent years a number of positive measures have been passed at the
state level to benefit you." The letter stated the choice in the Amendment No. 1
balloting as "[ejither preserve your rights and protect your heritage, or let the antigunners have an open door for their activity at the state level sometime in the
future."' 69 That letter, therefore, stated the position that Amendment No. 1 was
intended to protect those lawful rights then in existence under West Virginia law,
and further stated that the measure was intended to proscribe certain kinds of gun
control measures that might be enacted by some future legislature. There certainly
was no indication of any intent to overturn any provision of current law.
Other discussions of the amendment included similar assurances that the
passage of the measure would not be inconsistent with current statutes. A
Charleston Gazette outdoors columnist, Skip Johnson, commented on November
J. 1484-87 (Apr. 12, 1985).
SENATE J. 1640-42 (Apr. 12, 1985).
-Is See H.J.R. No. 18 (APPENDIX G, infra at 1175).

163 HOUSE
164

166 Id.

167 Letter from Charles H. Cunningham, West Virginia State Liaison, Nat'l Rifle Ass'n ("Institute for Legislative Action"), to candidates for public office and, reportedly, all NRA members in
the state (Oct. 14, 1986).
16,Id.
69Id.
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1, 1986, that he supported Amendment No. 1, which he described as a measure
that "would make an implied right a guaranteed one."' 7 0 A publication of the
Cooperative Extension Service of West Virginia University entitled AMENDMENTS TO THE WEST VIRGINIA CONSTITUTION FOR THE GENERAL
ELECTION 1986111 stated the general impression of the intent of Amendment No.
I as it was understood by the voters of the state during the 1986 campaign. The
purpose of the publication was "to provide an awareness and understanding of the
five amendments [including Amendment No. 1]."" Amendment No. 1 was on the
ballot, according to the publication, for the following reasons:
Basically it would assure citizens of West Virginia of the right to bear arms.
It would prevent local governments in the future from passing laws which would
restrict or prohibit a citizen's right to keep or bear arms.

In addition, it reaffirms the individual rights of West Virginia citizens to bear
arms.'

Like the Johnson column,"' the Cooperative Extension Service publication
also found that the rights guaranteed in Amendment No. 1 were rights implicitly
recognized in existing state laws. The booklet stated that "one can assume since
West Virginia citizens have been bearing arms for over 100 years it is an implied
right."'7 5 The description of Amendment No. 1 in that publication was flawed in
its use of the word "citizen" instead of the term "person" as used in the proposed
amendment. But, despite its lackpoflegal preparation and artless use of terms, the
publication was widely circulated and quoted by media sources in the state as an
authority on the five constitutional amendments on the West Virginia ballot in
1986.'17
The two major newspaper advertisements published by supporters of Amendment No. 1 reflected contrasting views of some effects of the proposed amendment. The first such advertisement was published on October 26, 1986, in
newspapers throughout the state. 77 That advertisement made four points:
(1) the suggestion that the West Virginia proposal was similar to those
already in the constitutions of forty states;
170Charleston Gazette, Nov. 1, 1986, § A, at 5,col. 1.
MA. FERRISE & D. SMITH, AMENDMENTS To THE WEST VIRGINIA CONSTITUTION FOR THE
GENERAL ELECTION 1986 (Cooperative Extension Service, W.V.U., R.D. Publication No. 731, Aug.
1986).
172 Id. at 1.
173 Id. at 2.
"' See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
17, A. FERRISE & D. SMIrrH supra note 171, at 2.
276 The publication was distributed statewide through the Cooperatie Extension Service.
"7,Charleston Gazette, Oct. 26, 1986, § D, at 13, col. 3. This advertisement also ran in other
newspapers throughout the state that day, including the Bluefield Daily Telegraph, the Wheeling Intelligencier, the Morgantown Dominion Post, the Beckley Register/Herald, the Fairmont Times,
the Huntington Herald Dispatch, the Parkersburg News-Sentinel, the Logan Banner, and the
Clarksburg Telegram. For text of advertisement see APPENDIX I, infra at 1179.
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(2) the implication that the amendment was similar to the second amendment
of the U.S. Constitution, and that passage of Amendment No. 1 was necessary to
insert such an amendment in the state constitution;
(3) a prominent statement that no existing federal or state law would be
repealed by passage, with the statement reading "Amendment 1 keeps Federal and
State firearms laws the law"; and
(4) that the ballot proposal was widely supported by officials and citizens of
West Virginia. "1 8
The second advertisement, a more detailed statement of the intent of the proposed amendment, was published in Sunday morning newspapers throughout the
state on November 2, 1986, just two days prior to the election.'179 Although paid
for by the same National Rifle Association political action committee as the October 26 Amendment, 8 ' the second advertisement advanced an interpretation of
the intent of the measure that was different in a significant fashion from that advanced in the March 1985, Analysis,' the October 26 advertisement, 82 or the
previous public statements describing the intent of that amendment. 83 That
November 2 advertisement purported to state, in bold letters, the "INTENT OF
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 1." In a significant deviation this advertisement stated that "Amendment 1 extends to open carrying of constitutionally
84
protected arms."'
That statement of intent was directly in conflict with the existing license law in
West Virginia"' requiring a license to carry a firearm, concealed or unconcealed,
anywhere off one's own premises. 8 6 While the March 1985 Analysis stated that a
license law like West Virginia's would be upheld under the right-to-bear-arms proposal,' 87 the November 2 advertisement limited such license laws under an AmendId.
Morgantown Dominion Post, Nov. 2, 1986, § D, at 12, col. 2. This advertisement was also
published statewide, including all newspapers listed in supra note 177. For text of advertisement see
APPENDIX J, infra at 1180.
"I United Sportsmen of West Virginia, a campaign committee established in West Virginia and
registered in the Secretary of State's office. The name of the registered treasurer, Mr. Robert R. Legg,
Jr., was included only in the November 2 advertisement. The committee's pre-general election report,
filed on October 30, 1986, reported total receipts of $33,420.10 and total expenditures of $31,677.13,
including an expenditure of $30,000 for newspaper ads. Total expenditures of the committee during the
Amendment No. #1 campaign are impossible to ascertain as of the writing of this article as a result of
that committee's failure to file, as of June 15, 1987, the post-election financial statement required to be
filed with the Secretary of State's office not less than 25 days nor more than 30 days after the election.
See W. VA. CODE § 3-8-5 (1985).
"I See supra notes 127-133 and accompanying text. •
12 See supra notes 177-178 and accompanying text.
179
171

See generally discussion supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
"'

Nov. 2, 1986 advertisement, see supra note 179.
VA. CODE § 61-7-1 to -12 (1985).

"' W.
186

Id.

'"

ANALYSis,

supra note 127, at APPENDIX H, infra at 1176.
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ment No. 1 analysis to "[t]he bearing of arms concealed may be regulated by, for
example, requiring a license to carry arms concealed. However, licensing would
have to be administered with the right to bear arms in mind. Furthermore, the carrying of arms may be restricted in places such as courtroom or polling places."' 88
This interpretation of Amendment No. 1 as inconsistent with the existing license
law of the state was in sharp contrast to the prominent assertion in the October 26
advertisement that "Amendment 1 keeps Federal and State firearms laws the
89
law. "
The November 2 advertisement also elaborated on the scope of the "criminal
misconduct" generally referred to in the 1985 Analysis as left in the power of the
Legislature to regulate even after pasage of Amendment No. 1.190 While the
Analysis suggested that the legislature "is left with the power to deal effectively
with criminal misconduct,"''9 the November 2 advertisement stated that the constitutional amendment "does not protect those who misuse firearms," and
included the following examples of such misconduct that the legislature may prohibit: "using arms to commit robbery, rape, burglary, assault; carrying arms while
intoxicated; using arms to unlawfully harass, intimidate, or recklessly endanger someone; shooting in an unsafe place or manner; and poaching."' 92 What is significant in that interpretation of Amendment No. 1 is the implication that other instances of carrying weapons without a license that are currently illegal could not
be prohibited after passage of Amendment No. 1. Examples of such instances might
include carrying arms without a license while not intoxicated, carrying arms without
a license when not using those arms to commit any illegal act, and carrying weapons
without a license in a rural area when not poaching. The clear implication of the
advertisement is, therefore, that the carrying of a weapon without a license without
intent to commit or the actual commission of a prohibited act with the firearm,
could not be prohibited. Such an implication would suggest that Amendment No.
1 would be inconsistent with existing state law.
So it would appear that the November 2 advertisement suggested an intent in
passing Amendment No. 1 that would be inconsistent with existing state law. Such
an interpretation, of course, would be contrary to prior statements by proponents
of the measure in the legislature and during the campaign, and would certainly be
inconsistent with the view of the amendment seen in the March 1985 Analysis, the
Extension Service publication,' 93 the October 26 advertisement, and, impliedly, the
perception of the voting public.
This apparent shift in the National Rifle Association interpretation of the
Nov. 2, 1986 advertisement see supra note 179.
Oct. 26, 1986 advertisemsent, see supra note 177.
190 Nov. 2, 1986 advertisement, see supra note 179.
" ANALYsis, supra note 127, at APPENDIX H, infra at 1176.
"' Nov. 2, 1986 advertisement, see supra note 179.
188
"'

"'

See supra note 171.
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amendment seen in the November 2 advertisement was quickly challenged by a
legislative opponent of the measure. Delegate McNeely, who had amended the
resolution on the floor of the West Virginia House of Delegates (only to see the
amendment lost in conference committee in the final version of the constitutional
amendment),' 9 charged in November 3 newspaper articles that the National Rifle
Association was attempting to use the published advertisements as a foundation
for a challenge to existing gun.regulation statutes in the state. 9
In a Charleston Gazette article, McNeely said that
The NRA has consistently denied this [Amendment No. 1] would do anything to
existing law-until now. The people of this state have been sandbagged....
They're [the NRA] running these ads to try to establish the legal intent of the voters

...so that afterward they can go into court and say the people had this ad in front
of them when they voted.... This [the November 2 advertisements] is not a
political
ad. It is a statement [of intent of the voters] they are going to take into
196
court.

In at least two of the articles published on November 3, National Rifle Association
representatives were quoted as previously stating that the amendment would not
impact on current weapons laws. The West Virginia liaison of the NRA was
quoted in the Morgantown Dominion-Post as having said "earlier" that "the
amendment would have no impact on present gun laws ...It is designed to prevent local or state laws being passed that would ban guns .... ',9
In the Charleston

Gazette article, an NRA lawyer' 98 was quoted as having said that the NRA
"doesn't plan to challenge any existing gun laws." He was further quoted as
stating that "the amendment would merely strengthen a current West Virginia law
that prohibits municipalities from banning guns."' 99
In an election day statement, McNeely's charges were answered by NRA attorney Robert Dowlut.2 °0 Charging that McNeely's statements were "the alarmist
views of one who tried to defeat it [Amendment No. 1] in the Legislature,"
Dowlut was quoted as "reiterat[ing] the NRA position that passage of the amendment ...

would not replace present gun regulations." Responding to the charge

that the "open carrying of constitutionally protected arms" language in the
November 2 advertisement indicated an interpretation inconsistent with the current
license law in the state, Dowlut was quoted as maintaining that "[p]resent laws
essentially allow open carrying for legitimate purposes." 2 0'
191 HOUSE

J. 583-84 (Mar. 20, 1985).

"I Charleston Gazette, Nov. 3, 1986, § A, at 11, col. 3.
196Id.
"I Morgantown Dominion Post, Nov. 3, 1986, § A, at 2, col. 1 (quoting Charles H. Cunningham,
West Virginia Liaison for the Nat'l Rifle Ass'n).
Charleston Gazette, Nov. 3, 1986, § A, at 11, col. 3.
Id. (quoting Robert Dowlut as an "NRA lawyer").
200 Charleston Gazette, Nov. 4, 1986, § A, at 10, col. 1.

201 Id.
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Contending that the intent of the amendment was "to protect traditional gun
uses and gun ownership-permitting people to protect themselves, their families
and their owns, that sort of thing," Dowlut denied that the November 2 advertisement was designed to support any challenge of current laws, and stated that he saw
no challenge to existing weapon laws "unless the Legislature would enact some
draconian gun law." Dowlut's views were echoed in that article by John Hopf,
regional NRA representative, who was quoted as stating that the amendment
"would not negate present gun regulations. If you needed a permit before, you'd
still need one, or if state regulations say you can't carry a loaded gun, you still
couldn't." ' And, in a statement informally indicating legislative intent, Delegate
Humphreys, chairman of the House Committee on Constitutional Revisions that
considered the measure in 1985, was quoted as stating that "our [the committee]
opinion was that it would not put Matt Dillon back on the streets." ' '
The Amendment No. 1 campaign ended, therefore, with the same exchange of
views that characterized that measure's progress through its legislative and campaign history-with opponents of the measure charging that the amendment appeared to impact on existing state laws, and proponents denying any intent to
negate any such law. With the counting of the ballots cast in the November 4 election, the voters of the state resolved the issue of whether Amendment No. 1 was to
place article III, section 22 in the state constitution. The amendment was ratified
of 342,963 in favor to 67,168 opposed, carrying every county in the
by a vote
20 4
state.
IV.

A.

Ti

IMPACT OF THE RIGHT-TO-BEAR-ARMS

AMENDMENT

The Impact on Existing State Weapons Statutes

The effect of Amendment No. 1 on the constitution and statutes of West
Virginia was a major point of controversy during the legislative and campaign
history of the measure. As has been discussed, 20 ' proponents generally took the
position that the amendment would have no effect on existing state law (with the
prominent exception of the November 2, 1986, advertisement)206 while opponents
language of the amendment as
expressed concern about the broad, unconditional
2 7
1
laws.
state
existing
contradict
to
it seemed
With no real statement of legislative intent prepared by any of the legislative
bodies that considered the proposal, and no existing record of even any substantial
202 Id.
203

Id.

20, Official Election Returns, General Election, 1986 (available in Secretary of State's office, State

Capitol, Charleston, W. Va.).
201 See generally supra notes 122-204 and accompanying text.
201 See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
10, See generally supra notes 122-204 and accompanying text.
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research done by any of the legislative committees that recommended the measure for
passage, there is little in the legislative history to assist in fixing any specific meaning to the words, phrases, or the whole of the amendment. All that can be said
without question was that legislative proponents consistently took the position that
the amendment, if adopted, would not change existing laws, and that legislative
opponents consistently attempted, with no ultimate success, to amend the measure
to assure that the state would retain its ability to maintain the existing state of the
law. 20 8 With that general description of legislative activity, it could be argued that
the legislative process on the measure was marked by a very real lack of any
research, statements, or other formal procedures that might assist in assigning formal meaning to the amendment.
The campaign history of the amendment is hardly more helpful than the
legislative history. There was virtually no opposition to the measure, and certainly
no organized opposition. 20 1 Except for the notable exception of the November 2
advertisement, the proponents used their organized campaign to reaffirm
the idea
210
that Amendment No. 1 would have no impact on existing state laws.
So if the language in the November 2 advertisement suggesting that the amendment was inconsistent with the existing state license law is discounted as either a
misdrafted advertisement or an ineffective attempt to lay the groundwork for a legal
challenge to those statutes, 21' there would seem to be no real argument that
legislative and voter intent was to do anything other than place an amendment in
the state constitution that would be completely consistent with existing state law.
That general intent seems, on the available record, to be so pervasive on the part
of both legislative and voter proponents that any analysis on the impact of the
amendment would have to be based upon that foundation of intent.
What do the terms in the amendment mean? The general rule in West Virginia
is that constitutional construction is governed by the same general rules as those
applied in statutory construction, 2 2 so the meaning of a phrase or terms would
generally first be sought in the plain and ordinary meaning of the words
themselves. 2"1To the extent that no ambiguity or obscurity exists in the meanings,
such a term or phrase should be applied, and not interpreted or construed. 21'
Id.
The Secretary of State's office had no committee registered in opposition to Amendment No. I
as of Feb. 27, 1987.
210 See supra note 179 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 122-204 and accompanying
208
209

text.
211 The November 2 advertisement appears to be inconsistent with public statements of proponents of Amendment No. I both before and after the publication of that advertisement. See supra
notes 179-193 and accompanying text.
2I State ex rel. Brotherton v. Blankenship, 157 W. Va. 100, 108, 207 S.E.2d 421, 427 (1973).
213 Ray v. McCoy, 321 S.E.2d 90, 92 (f.
Va. 1984); State ex rel. Dunbar v. Stone, 159 W. Va.
331, 334-35, 221 S.E.2d 791, 793 (1976) (and cases cited therein).
234 Foster v. Cooper, 155 W. Va. 619, 622-23, 186 S.E.2d 837,839 (1972). See also Ray, 321
S.E.2d at 92; Dunbar, 159 W. Va. at 335, 221 S.E.2d at 793.
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If there is, however, an unclear or ambiguous phrase or term, interpretation
may proceed according to well-recognized rules of construction of written
documents, which allow consideration of extrinsic evidence of the meaning of the
constitutional provision. 21 5 This may include recourse to legislative proceedings,2 ' 6
definitions given phrases and terms by previous judicial decisions 217 (although the
West Virginia court has declared that it is not bound by decisions of other state
courts or federal courts as to meaning of terms, 2"I a potentially important point in
the analysis of new article III, section 22 of the state constitution), contemof the ascerporaneous and practical construction, 2 9 and finally, consideration
220
tainable intent of the people in adopting the amendment.
The amendment then must be considered as a whole with effect given, if possible, to every part and word of the provision. 221 Furthermore, the amendment as a
whole should be applied to the West Virginia Constitution and existing statutes as
"the latest expression of the will of the people. ' 2 22 The general rule in such application is that any antecedent constitutional provision that is inconsistent with
the adopted amendment to the extent that harmonization of the two is impossible,
or any antecedent statute with no reasonable construction that would uphold its
the new constitutional language, would be impliedly, if
constitutionality in light22of
3
not expressly, repealed.
Early in the history of the state, the West Virginia court recognized the state
constitution as a limitation on the plenary power of the legislature to act. In Ex
parte William Stratton,22 an 1866 decision, the court noted that "[o]ur legislature
possessing all the legislative power of the State, it follows that it [was] competent
for it to pass [the act], prescribing the test oath in question, unless such power is
excluded by the terms of the constitution ....

or by clear and necessary implica-

' 221

That view of legislative power in the state pursuant to article III, section 2
tion.
of the constitution 226 being plenary in nature unless "foreclosed by some other

generally Diamond v. Parkersburg-Aetna Corp., 146 W. Va. 543, 122 S.E.2d 436 (1961).
generally May v. Topping, 65 W. Va. 656, 64 S.E. 848 (1909).
"I Exparte Bornee, 76 W. Va. 360, 363, 85 S.E. 529, 530 (1915). "The settled construction of a
constitutional provision made before its adoption into the Constitution of this State should be held as
the just interpretation thereof." Id. at 363-64, 85 S.E. at 530, citing People v. Webb, 38 Cal. 467).
"IlState v. Wender, 149 W. Va. 413, 420, 141 S.E.2d 359, 364 (1965).
219 Bornee, 76 W. Va. 360, 85 S.E. 848. See also State ex rel. Charleston v. Sims, 132 W. Va. 826,
839-40, 54 S.E.2d 729, 737 (1949). But see May, 65 W. Va. at 664-65, 64 S.E. at 851-52 (for limitations
on use of contemporaneous or practical construction).
220 Brotherton, 157 W. Va. at 110-11, 207 S.E.2d at 427.
221 Diamond, 146 W. Va. at 553-54, 122 S.E.2d at 442-43.
2
State ex rel. Kanawha County Bldg. Comm. v. Paterno, 160 W. Va. 195, 203, 233 S.E.2d 332,
337 (1977).
2" See
216 See

222 Id. at 203-04, 233 S.E.2d at 337.

4 Ex parte Stratton, 1 W. Va. 304 (1866).
222 Id. at 305.
2 "All power

is vested in, and consequently derived from, the people." W. VA. CONsT. art. III,
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provision of the Constitution" was reaffirmed as being beyond question in
Kanawha County Public Library v. County Court, 27 a 1958 West Virginia decision.
At the same time, the court in Kanawha County Public Library noted that an
"Act of the Legislature is not to be declared void unless the violation of the Constitution is so manifest as to leave no room for reasonable doubt."" With the
foundation of clear legislative and voter intent that the right-to-bear-arms amendment not impact on any existing state laws, the question becomes one of whether
the terms, phrases, and the whole of the new constitutional language can be given
reasonable meanings that cause the amendment to be applied and construed in
such a way as to carry out that intent. The thrust of this analysis is to suggest that
Amendment No. 1 must be given meaning as a whole that is consistent with
legislative and voter intent to retain all existing state laws if at all possible, even if
the meaning of a specific term or phrase within the amendment in the plain and ordinary meaning of the words themselves22' might seem inconsistent with existing
state law. Given a clear legislative and voter intent to retain existing case and
statutory law coupled with the complete absence of a statement expressing any intent to repeal such case law or statute, the "guiding star" in the analysis should be
the preservation, if possible, of existing statutes and case law.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to delve into the current, historical, and
possible meanings for each term or phrase in the amendment. But several more
general comments can be made about the wording of Amendment No. 1 that are
based not upon a detailed common law study of the meaning of terms, but
rather upon case law and statutory treatment of those terms and phrases in
West Virginia during the development of its weapons statutes. Other meanings can
be assigned based upon the clear intent of the legislature and the voters in passage
of Amendment No. 1. So it might be suggested that much of the assignment of
meaning to the amendment can be found within that historical context.
First, what is a "person" in the context of Amendment No. 1? It can be
argued that the voters believed that term meant "citizen" as they voted for the

§ 2. See also W. VA. CONsT. art. VI, § I ("The legislative power shall be vested in a Senate and House
of Delegates.").
227

Since Ex Parte Stratton, I W. Va. 305, the position that this section [W. VA. CONsT. art. III,
§ 2] vests in the Legislature of this State almost plenary powers on every subject, not
foreclosed by some other provision of the Constitution, has not been questioned. The powers
of the Legislature of this State are not to be confused with those of the Congress of the
United States. The Federal Constitution is a grant of power, while the Constitution of this
State is a restriction of power. While we look to the Federal Constitution to see what Congress may do, we look to our Constitution to see what the Legislature may not do.
Kanawha County Pub. Library v. County Court, 143 W. Va. 385, 390-91, 102 S.E.2d 712, 716 (1958).
228 Id. at 391,
102 S.E.2d at 716.
229 See supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.
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measure-in fact, the Cooperative Extension Service publication explaining all of

the amendments proposed in the 1986 general election described Amendment No. 1
as one that "basically ...

bear arms.

'2 0

would assure citizens of West Virginia of the right to

The October 26, 1986, advertisement2" ' supporting the passage of

the measure flatly stated that "Yes on Amendment #1 protects the rights of all
law-abiding citizens in West Virginia .... -32 And even the November 2, 1986,
advertisement 23 assured the reader that "excluded from this right [to keep and

bear arms] would be convicted felons, mental incompetents, minors and illegal
aliens. 23 4 All of the excluded categories listed are persons, but none enjoys the
full rights of citizens.
The March 1985 Analysis2 3 1 supplied to the legislature by proponents of the
measure indicated "[t]he proposed amendment guarantees an individual right."
But, it went on to say that "[n]evertheless, a person in a high risk category would
not enjoy this right. That, e.g., felons, minors, and the mentally infirm are treated
differently has gained ... universal acceptance .... "236 Again, the listed
categories are those without full citizenship rights.

So, the term "person" in the amendment would have to be construed to have
a narrower meaning than the broad definition of "a human being ' 23 generally
assigned the term. It seems to be clear that the understanding and intent of the
voter was that the term "'person" mean "a person who is a citizen."
230 See supra notes 171-175 and accompanying text.
"I See supra note 177 (Text at APPENDIX I, infra at 1179).
232

Id.

233 See supra note 179 (Text at APPENDIX J, infra at 1180).
234

Id.

235 See supra note 127 (Text at APPENDIX H, infra at 1176).

Id.
"I BLACK's LAW DICIONARY 1028 (5th ed. 1979). The term "person" in the W. VA. CODE also includes corporations if not restricted by the context of its use. 21A MICHIE'S JUR. Words and Phrases
236

304 (1987). The inclusion of a specific prohibition against employees being armed upon the premises of
an employer without a license in the 1925 statute would imply that the term "person" in the 1909
statute included the right of an artificial person to arm itself through its agents upon its own premises.
The necessity of reading the word "person" more narrowly than its common meaning in order to
follow legislative and voter intent can be seen in the impact of the use of the term in other constitutions.
Only four other state constitutions use the term "person" in their right-to-bear-arms provisions (COLO.
CONsT. art. II, § 13; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 20; MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 6; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 12). A
Michigan statute prohibiting possession of a pistol by an unnaturalized foreign born resident (a legal
alien), which is comparable to current W. VA. CODE § 61-7-2 (1984) (alien cannot obtain a license to
carry a weapon), W. VA. CODE § 61-7-8 (1984) (legal alien cannot keep or bear a firearm except for
lawful hunting purposes), and W. VA. CODE § 61-7-9 (1984) (supply of weapon to legal alien except for
hunting purposes unlawful), was declared unconstitutional by the Michigan court in People v. Zerillo,
219 Mich. 635, 189 N.W. 927 (1922) because of the use of the term "person" in the Michigan constitution. The Colorado court, applying that state's right-to-bear-arms constitutional language to a statute
prohibiting the possession by a felon of a firearm, found that a felon-defendant charged under that
statute could raise the affirmative defense that such possession was for a constitutionally protected purpose, thereby recognizing that the use of the term "person" did include felons in the right to bear arms.
People v. Ford, 193 Colo. 459, 568 P.2d 26 (1977).
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The phrase "has the right to keep and bear" is easily defined consistent with
the intent of the legislature and voters to preserve existing state law. It would
mean, in the narrowest interpretation, the traditional right in West Virginia law to
own, keep, and carry firearms on one's own property or premises.23" That is a
right that has never been questioned by West Virginia law from the inception of
the state. 39 In the March 1985 Analysis, proponents of the amendment generally
described the proposed measure as one "explicitly protect[ing] the traditional
lawful rights that gun owners assumed were guaranteed in West Virginia. 240 The
October 26 advertisement declared that "Amendment #1 keeps Federal and State
firearms laws the law, 241 and proponents were consistently quoted state wide 42
as
declaring that the amendment would keep intact the license law in West Virginia.
On the other hand, the November 2 advertisement suggested that the right to
carry weapons without a license would extend to open carrying without license.243
That advertisement, as has been noted, was effectively disclaimed by prominent
proponents of the amendment shortly after its publication,244 and there is certainly
no other suggestion of such a reading of the amendment to be found in any other
statements of proponents. More importantly, any reading of the amendment to
repeal the existing license statute would be completely inconsistent with legislative
and voter intent as well as understanding of the amendment; and would be totally
inconsistent with traditional weapons regulation in the state that, since early in the
century, has required either a hunting license, a gun
permit, or statutory authoriza24
tion to carry a weapon off one's own premises.
What meaning should be assigned the term "arms" in the amendment? Certinaly this term may be defined by the common law use of the word, but the context of the amendment suggests a clear meaning that is already established in the
case law of the state. As has been noted, definitions given phrases and terms
by previous judicial decisions, such as the specific refusal of the Workman court
to classify pistols, revolvers, and other handguns as constitutionlly-protected
weapons, ' 6 are incorporated into succeeding constitutional amendments and statutes
unless expressly repealed, or repealed by necessary implication.2 4 Certainly, no
competent drafter of firearms laws or constitutional amendments could be unaware
of the specific holding in Workman that handguns are not constitutionally pro-

See generally supra notes 1-121 and accompanying text.
See supra note 237.
240 See generally supra notes 122-204 and accompanying text.
241 See supra note 177.
242 See generally supra notes 122-204 and accompanying text.
23 See supra note 179.
24 See supra notes 200-204 and accompanying text.
243 See supra notes 122-204 and accompanying text.
246 Workman, 35 W. Va. at 373, 14 S.E. at 11.
247 See supra notes 216-21 and accompanying text. See also Kanawha County Pub. Library, 143
21,

"I

W. Va. at 391, 102 S.E.2d at 712.
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tected "arms" in West Virginia."4 8 Though it is true that Workman was defining
terms in the militia context of the United States Constitution second amendment,
the language of Workman2 '9 as well as a line of cases extending through the state's
case law on firearms strongly suggests that such easily concealable weapons have
never been recognized by the legislature or by the West Virginia Supreme Court
2 50
of Appeals as having an equal status with long-guns, such as rifles and shotguns.
Arguably, the term "arms" can include only those weapons that are recognized under state law and tradition as used for the "defense of self, family, home and
state."12 5 ' There is no language following the term "arms," such as "including
pistols, revolvers and like firearms," that would have addressed the Workman
definition of "arms" in the state. The term would exclude, therefore, such handguns. Also excluded would be other weapons not recognized in the state as traditional firearms for use in all of the listed uses. What would be included, therefore,
would be the long-guns, such as rifles and shotguns, and such firearms that are appropriate for all the listed constitutional uses and that have traditionally received
recognition from the West Virginia court as appropriate personal and militia
252
weapons.
Whatever the classes of firearms protected by the amendment, does the
language of the amendment permit the carrying of those weapons for those particular purposes without a license to do so? Contextually, this requires considering
the phrase "has the right to keep and bear" with the phrase "for the dffense of

"I Workman, 35 W. Va. at 373, 14 S.E. at 11.
249Although the primary analysis in Workman was of militia-type weapons, or those "arms to be
used in defending the State and civil liberty," the Workman court clearly expressed its attitude towards
the carrying of pistols and revolvers in describing such firearms as those "usually employed in brawls,
street fights, duels, and affrays, and [those that] are only habitually carried by bullies, blackguards, and
desperadoes, to the terror of the community and the injury of the state." Id.
2,0

Prior to 1925, long-guns could apparently be carried in the state without a permit. See supra

notes 71-82 and accompanying text for discussion of inclusion of long-guns in 1925 firearms statute.
See discussions of Workman, Barnett, Blazovitch, and Kinney, supra notes 20-64 and accompanying
text for the court's interpretation of legislative intent and the court's support of that intent to suppress
the carrying of pistols, revolvers, and other such handguns.
"' W. VA. CoNsr. art. III, § 22 (1986) (the right-to-bear-arms amendment).
252 The contextual analysis suggests that the phrase "for the defense of self, family, home and
state" would include, because of the use of the conjunctive "and," only those weapons recognized for
-use in all categories listed. A tear gas pen might be ah appropriate personal defense weapon, but would
not be an appropriate militia (defense of state) weapon. On the other hand, a sophisticated military
weapon would not be an appropriate personal defense weapon. Further support for the conjunctive
analysis is seen in the inclusion of the phrase "and for lawful hunting and recreational use," set off by
a comma from the preceeding phrase, in the amendment. This suggests that such use is in addition to
the weapons included in "the defense of self, family, home and state."
The alternative available to the drafter of the amendment would have been to use the disjunctive
"or" in the phrase, making it read "for the defense of self, family, home or state." This would have
included any weapon appropriate for use in any one of the four categories, rather than the conjunctive
inclusion of only those arms appropriate in all four categories as in the amendment as passed.
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self, family, home and state." These two phrases together do suggest a right to

defense while armed with constitutionally protected weapons. This could have the
effect of creating an exception to the Foley"3 holding that the right to self-defense

under the West Virginia Constitution 254 did not include the right to armed selfdefense.2 55 Such an exception would recognize the right to armed self-defense under
the standards established in Workman256 and Barnett,217 provided that the amendment's language is found to be as broad as the right to self-defense.2

8

Yet, even

if a right to armed defense as broad as the right to self-defense is found to have
been created by the passage of Amendment No. 1, there is no language in that
amendment modifying the strict standards necessary to establish the right to selfdefense enumerated in Barnett and Workman.2 59
The final phrase in the amendment-"and for lawful hunting and recreational
use"-is the one that has the clearest meaning. It incorporates the traditional
statutory exception to the license statutes which allows a hunting license to serve as
a license to carry the 0lawful hunting weapon under circumstances as set out by the
26
hunting regulations.
How can the right-to-bear-arms amendment be summed up in the context of
state law, case law in West Virginia through the development of weapons statutes,
and the implications of the amendment itself? Several conclusions might be suggested:
Foley, 128 W. Va. 166, 35 S.E.2d 854 (discussed supra notes 112-119 and accompanying text).
W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 1. See Workman, 35 W. Va. at 370-71, 14 S.E. at 10.
"I Foley, 128 W. Va. at 181, 35 S.E.2d at 861-62; see also supra note 118 and accompanying text.
216 Workman, 35 W. Va. at 374, 14 S.E. at 11-12.
117
Barnett, 34 W. Va. at 77-78, 11 S.E. at 736.
" Self-defense in West Virginia is defined as the right to defend one's self, one's relatives, and
one's habitation and property. 9B MICHIE'S JUR. Homicide § 39, 46-47 (1984) (and cases cited therein).
A more general definition is "the right of a man to repel force by force even to the taking of a life in
defense of his person, property or habitation, or of a member of his family, against anyone who
manifests, intends, attempts or endeavors by violence or surprise, to commit a forcible felony."
BLACK's LAW DICrIONARY 1219 (5th ed. 1979).
Any defense of state is lawful only upon a lawful summons from the state. See Zerillo, 219 Mich.
635, 189 N.W. 927 (Michigan court implied condition of lawful summons into right-to-bear-arms
language similar to that in W. VA. CONST. Art. III, § 22). Logic would compel such an implication,
since a person could not defend a state against that state's will.
The phrase "defense of self, family, home" in Amendment No. 1 would appear, by the use of the
word "home" rather than the term "property" or the term "premises," to be somewhat narrower than
either the accepted definition of self-defense or the statutory exception from the license law for carrying
arms "upon one's premises." W. VA. CODE § 61-7-3, 61-7-8 (1984).
259 For discussion of incorporation of current state of the law into constitutional amendments, see
supra notes 212-29 and accompanying text.
260 All the statutes prior to the 1925 amendments apparently did not address the carrying of longguns. See supra note 250. The 1925 statute, and all amendments since that year, have included in the requirement for a license to carry a high powered rifle or other such firearms an exemption for such
weapons carried incident to lawful hunting use. See supra note 82 (1925 statute, APPENDIX E, infra
at 1167), supra note 120 (1975 statute, APPENDIX F, infra at 1173).
253

21,
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A citizen may own, keep at his home, and use in defense of himself, his
family, and his home firearms of a kind and character determined by the state, except that the state may not deny such a citizen access to an assortment of firearms
sufficient to accomplish the constitutionally-protected defenses. Handguns, under
the Workman analysis, would not be included as constitutionally-protected
26
weapons; '
- Such a citizen may affirmatively assert the right of self-defense to any proof the state, but only if the self-defense satisfies the
secution under the license laws
2 62
standards;
Workman
Barnett- Such a citizen may carry firearms according to hunting license regulations;
and
Other than the constitutional right to keep a reasonable assortment of
constitutionally-protected weapons at his home and the right to advance the affirmative defense of self-defense against a license law violation if the weapon used
was a constitutionally-protected one, such acitizen is subject to all existing weapon
statutes in the state.

Again, the above discussion is limited to an examination of the meaning of the
amendment in the context of an intended presumption that it is consistent with
state common law and all constitutional provisions. A complete analysis of the
amendment would require a thorough analysis of the common law and statutory
meanthgs assigned the terms and phrases. It is suggested, however, that if the intent of the legislature and voters was to prepare and approve a constitutional
amendment consistent with existing law and cases-and there appears to be abundant evidence to support such a contention- 263 the guiding star of that intent must
necessarily lead to an interpretation that places reasonable meanings on the terms
and phrases, and the entirety of the amendment consistent to the greatest extent
possible with the current state of the law in West Virginia.
B.

The Impact on Future State Weapons Statutes

From statements by the proponents of Amendment No. 1, it appears that the
primary intent of the measure was to constitutionalize current state law forbidding
26
municipalities from banning the ownership of firearms. It would appear that this
265
purpose would be accomplished. However, the Workman holding that handguns
were not constitutionally-protected weapons could well serve to withhold this constitutional protection from such firearms. If the amendment was held to overturn
the Workman holding, despite the lack of specific language implying such effect,
handguns would receive constitutional protection.

See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
M See Barnett-Workman discussion supra notes 20-46 and accompanying text.
213 See supra notes 122-204 and accompanying text.
261

214W. VA. CODE § 61-7-8 (1984).
21S

See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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Under any interpretation of the amendment, some kinds of firearms must be
available for ownership and carrying about one's home. The exact kinds of
weapons might well be subject to regulation in the future, as long as a reasonable
assortment remained available sufficient to provide the type of defenses allowed in
the constitution.
The only other impact on future state firearms regulations that the amendment
might have would be the creation of a constitutional self-defense exception to
all license law provisions, provided that the weapon used is a constitutionally protected one and the self-defense satisfies the standards established by BarnettWorkman (or some future state standard). 2"6 Arguably, the amendment has created
a constitutiofial right to armed self-defense, to the extent that the language of the
amendment is read as coextensive with the recognized right to self-defense.
The impact on future state actions would be dependent on the application of
the amendment to current statutes and case law. To the extent that the amendment
is interpreted consistent with those statutes and holdings, future development of
the statutes may continue. Any repeal by implication of state law would preclude
the state from acting in that area in the future.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Right to Keep and Bear Arms Amendment to the West Virginia Constitution was a popular amendment both in the legislature and among the voters of the
state. But the legislative process failed to give the amendment's language any real
definition beyond a general sense that passage of the amendment would leave undisturbed current law and constitutionalize existing state law prohibiting municipal
governments from banning the ownership of weapons or ammunition. 2 7 Sadly
lacking in the legislative process was any indication of independent research on the
part of members or staff. The very popularity of the concept seemed to insulate
the proposed amendment from the "hard look" analysis appropriate for amendments to a constitution.
In searching for a framework for analysis of Amendment No. 1, a review of
the history of weapon regulation in West Virginia 21 indicates that the state has
historically allowed a citizen to own and keep upon his premises virtually any
firearm. Only federal law prevents the ownership and possession of particular
weapons upon one's premises in the state. The attitude of the state has been, it
seems, that every citizen has a right to arm his "castle" as he sees fit.
Coupled with this lenient attitude toward ownership and possession upon
one's own premises has been a negative attitude about possession of weapons away

266

See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.

267 W. VA. CODE § 61-7-8 (1984).
216 See supra notes 1-121 and accompanying text.
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from one's own premises. From its inception, the state government steadily increased regulation of firearms carried off one's premises. In the face of the labor
and social unrest of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the state
toughened its regulation of firearms to prohibit the carrying of weapons without
either statutory authorization or a license (either a license to carry a firearm or a
hunting license).269
The current state of the law represents that balance-a virtually unlimited
right to purchase and possess weapons upon one's own premises, but a highly
restrictive carrying statute. It was in this balanced environment that the Right to
Keep and Bear Arms Amendment was introduced and approved.
As is indicated by a review of the legislative and campaign history of the
amendment,2 70 there was no indication of any intent to upset that balance during
legislative debate by the proponents of the measure. In fact, it might be suggested
that the primary argument used to gain passage was that the constitutional amendment would not impact on the existing state of the law.
As was indicated at the outset, the concentration of this Article has been an
overview of the historical development of firearms regulation in the state and the
legislative and campaign history of the approval of Amendment No. 1. Such an
overview can hopefully serve as a basis for further study of the impact of the
passage of the amendment on both the existing state of the law and future statutes.
71
A general look at the possible impact of the amendment has indicated,1
however, that the analytical foundation for ascertaining that impact ought to be
the legislative and voter intent that the amendment be interpreted consistent with
the current state of the law. Adoption of such a foundation would make that intent the "guiding star" of judicial interpretation of the amendment, with each
word, phrase, and the entirety of the amendment reasonably defined to remain
consistent with the existing state of weapons. Finally, the amendment as defined
consistent with the current state of the law has been briefly reviewed as to its possi2 72
ble impact on future statutes.

At the outset, the desire of the legislature and the voters of West Virginia to
place the new article III, section 22 in the constitution was recognized. The question addressed in this Article has been not whether some right was granted, but
rather how the amendment fits into the history of the state, its current weapons
laws, and its ability to respond to future situations with statutory provisions.

269 1882 W. Va. Acts ch. 135, § 7 (see supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text); 1909 W. Va.
Acts ch. 51, § 7 (see supranotes 49-54); 1925 W. Va. Acts ch. 3, § 7 (1st Extraordinary Sess.) (see supra
notes 82-89 and accompanying text).
110See supra notes 122-204 and accompanying text.
27 See supra notes 205-260 and accompanying text.
2,2 See supra notes 267-271 and accompanying text.
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Given the legislature's failure to provide clear legislative intent in any formal
sense, it shall be up to the judicial branch of the state to interpret the amendment
consistent with its language and demonstrated intent. With that interpretation, the
court may continue the state's traditional legal attitude toward firearms by finding
the amendment consistent with state law, or it may embark the state on an uncharted course of repeal and revision of long-standing statutes and case law.
It might be suggested, therefore, that the lack of formal legislative intent
creates a situation in which the judicial branch of the state government must chart
the public policy of the state in weapons regulation. A literal reading of the
amendment would certainly seem at odds with the clear intent of the legislature
(although informally expressed) and the voters. The West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals will therefore eventually be asked to determine the future public policy
of the state in the absence of formal legislative findings as to the impact of
Amendment No. 1 on current and future firearms regulation in West Virginia. It
is, perhaps, ironic that such a lack of legislative research and formal legislative
findings, coupled with the broad, unqualified language of Amendment No. 1,213
have combined to place the future of firearms regulation, heretofore primarily a
legislative activity, in the hands of the judicial branch of state government.21 4

273 The drafting of Amendment No. I suggested an unconditional grant to all persons, particularly
when read in context with existing state constitutional provisions. Compare with W. Va. Const. art. III,
§ 22 (1986).
27, In a case still in litigation as this Article is prepared for publication, A West Virginia
circuit
court judge has declared W. VA. CODE § 61-7-1 (1984) unconstitutional. In State ex rel City of
Princeton v. Buckner, No. 87-C-337-F (Mercer County Cir. Court, May 12, 1987) (order denying writ of
mandamus), Chief Judge John R. Frazier found that article 3, section 22 of the West Virginia Constitution (the right to keep and bear arms amendment) has voided W. VA. CODE § 61-7-1 insofar as it requires a license for the carrying of firearms.
Judge Frazier stayed the effect of his findings until the matter could be resolved by the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, and certified the question of the constitutionality of the statute as
well as the question of the power of the legislature to regulate the right to keep and bear arms to that
court. Buckner was filed with the Supreme Court of Appeals on June 3, 1987. As of June 15, 1987,
no further action had been taken on the matter.
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[In the following appendices, the original citation form and style remains intact.

Ed.]

APPENDIX A
W. VA. CODE Ch.

CLIII, § 8 (1868)

8. If any person go armed with a deadly or dangerous weapon, without
reasonable cause to fear violence to his person, family, or property, he may be required to give a recognizance, with the right to appeal, as before provided, and like
proceedings shall be had on appeal.

APPENDIX B
1872-73 W. VA. ACTS ch. 226, §§ 168-69
Chapter CCXXVI
168. If a justice shall, from his own observation or upon information of
others, have good reason to believe that any person in his county is habitually
carrying about his person concealed weapons, such as dirks, bowie knives, pistols
or other dangerous weapons, it shall be the duty of such justice to cause such person to be arrested and brought before him, and if such person upon trial shall be
found guilty, he shall be fined not exceeding ten dollars.
169. If any justice of the peace shall willfully fail to execute the duties imposed on him by the ... one hundred and sixty-eighth [section] of this act he shall
be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and liable to an indictment in the circuit court
of his county for the same, and if found guilty, shall be fined not exceeding fifty
dollars.
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APPENDIX C
1882 W. VA. ACTS ch. 135, § 7
CHAPTER CXXXV
7. If a person carry about his person any revolver or other pistol, dirk, bowie
knife, razor, slung shot, billy, metalic or other false knuckles, or any other
dangerous or deadly weapon of like kind or character, he shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor, and fined not less than twenty-five nor more than two hundred
dollars, and may, at the discretion of the court, be confined in jail not less than
one, nor more than twelve months; and if any person shall sell or furnish any such
weapon as is hereinbefore mentioned to a person whom he knows, or has reason,
from his appearance or otherwise, to believe to be under the age of twenty-one
years, he shall be punished as hereinbefore provided; but nothing herein contained
shall be so construed as to prevent any person from keeping or carrying about his
dwelling house or premises any such revolver or other pistol, or from carrying the
same from the place of purchase to his dwelling house, or from his dwelling house
to any place where repairing is done, to have it repaired, and back again. And if
upon the trial of an indictment for carrying any such pistol, dirk, razor or bowie
knife, the defendant shall prove to the satisfaction of the jury that he is a quiet and
peaceable citizen, of good character and standing in the community in which he
lives, and at the time he was found with such pistol, dirk, razor or bowie knife, as
charged in the indictment, he had good cause to believe and did believe that he was
in danger of death or great bodily harm at the hands of another person, and that
he was, in good faith, carrying such weapon for self defense and for no other purpose, the jury shall find him not guilty. But nothing in this section contained shall
be so construed as to prevent any officer charged with the execution of the laws of
the state from carrying a revolver or other pistol, dirk or bowie knife.
APPENDIX D
1909 W. VA. ACTs ch. 51, § 7
CHAPTER 51.
Sec. 7. If any person, without a state license therefor, carry about his person
any revolver or other pistol, dirk, bowie knife, slung shot, razor, billy, metallic or
other false knucldes, or any other dangerous or deadly weapon of like kind and
character, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof be
confined in the county jail for a period of not less than six nor more than twelve
months for the first offense; but upon conviction of the same person for the second offense in this state, he shall be guilty of a felony and be confined in the
penitentiary not less than one nor more than five years, and in either case fined not
less than fifty nor more than two hundred dollars, at the discretion of the court;
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and it shall be the duty of the prosecuting attorney in all cases to ascertain whether
or not the charge made by the grand jury is the first or second offense, and if it
shall be the second offense it shall be so stated in the indictment returned, and the
prosecuting attorney shall introduce the record evidence before the trial court of
said second offense, and shall not be permitted to use his discretion in charging
said second offense nor in introducing evidence to prove the same on the trial; provided, that boys under the age of eighteen years, upon the second conviction, may,
at the discretion of the court, be sent to the reform school of the state. Any person
may obtain a state license to carry any such weapon within any county in this state
by publishing a notice in some newspaper published in the county in which he
resides, setting forth his name, residence and occupation, and that on a certain day
he will apply to the circuit court of his county for such state license, and after the
publication of such notice for at least ten days before said application is made and
at the time stated in said notice upon application to said circuit court, it may grant
such person a license in the following manner, to-wit:
First.Such person must prove to said court that he is over twenty-one years of
age; that he is a person of good moral character, of temperate habits, and is not
addicted to intoxication, and has not been convicted of a felony nor of any other
offense involving the use on his part in an unlawful manner of any such weapon.
Second. He shall file with said court an application stating the purpose or purposes for which he desired to carry any such weapon, and shall show in such application, and prove to the court, good reason and cause for carrying such
weapon. Thereupon, if such circuit court be satisfied from the proof that there is
good reason and cause for such person to carry such weapon, and all of the other
conditions of this act be complied with, said circuit court may grant said license;
but before the said license shall be effective such person shall pay to the sheriff,
and the court shall so certify in its order granting the license, the sum of ten
dollars, and shall also file a bond with the clerk of said court, in the penalty of
three thousand five hundred dollars, with good security, signed by a responsible
person or persons, or by some surety company, authorized to do business in this
state, conditioned that such applicant will not carry such weapon except in accordance with his said application and as authorized by the court, and that he will pay
all costs and damages accruing to any one by the accidental discharge or improper,
negligent or illegal discharge or use of said pistol. Any such license shall be good
for one year, unless sooner revoked, and be co-extensive with the state, and all
licenses collected hereunder shall be accounted for to the auditor and paid over by
the sheriffs as other license taxes are collected and paid, and the state tax commissioner shall prepare all suitable forms for licenses and bonds and certificate showing that such license has been granted, and do anything else in the premises to protect the state and to see to the enforcement of this act.
Provided, that nothing herein shall prevent any person from carrying any such
weapon, in good faith and not for a felonious purpose, upon his own premises,
nor shall anything herein prevent a person from carrying any such weapon (and if
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it be a revolver or other pistol unloaded) from the place of purchase to his home or
place of residence or a place of repair and back to his home or residence; and, provided, further, that in cases of riot, public danger and emergency, a justice of the
peace or other person issuing a warrant may authorive [sic] a special constable and
his posse to carry weapons for the purpose of executing a process, and a sheriff in
such cases may authorize a deputy or posse to carry weapons, but the justice shall
write on his docket the causes and reasons for such authority and the person so
authorized, and index the same, and the sheriff or other officer shall write out and
file with the clerk of the county court the reasons and causes for such authority
and the person so authorized, and the same shall always be open to public inspection, and such authority shall authorize such special constable, deputies and posses
to carry weapons in good faith only for the specific purposes and times named in
such authority, and upon the trial of every indictment the jury shall inquire into
the good faith of the person attempting to defend any such indictment under the
authority granted by any such justice, sheriff or other officer, and any such persons so authorized shall be personally liable for the injury caused any one by the
negligent or unlawful use of any such weapon. It shall be the duty of all ministerial
officers, consisting of the justices of the peace, notaries public and other conservators of the peace of this state, to report to the prosecuting attorney of the county
the names of all persons guilty of violating this section, and any person wilfully
failing so to do, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be fined not exceeding
two hundred dollars, and shall, moreover, be liable to removal from office for
such wilful failure: and it shall likewise be the duty of every person having
knowledge of the violation of this act, to report the same to the prosecuting attorney, and to freely and fully give evidence concerning the same, and any one failing so to do, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be
fined not exceeding one hundred dollars; provided, further, that nothing herein
contained shall be so construed as to prohibit regularly elected sheriffs, their
regularly appointed deputies, who collect taxes in each county, and all regularly
elected constables in their respective counties and districts, and all regularly appointed police officers of their respective cities, towns or villages, from carrying
such weapons as they are now authorized by law to carry, who shall have given
bond in the penalty of not less than thirty-five hundred dollars, conditioned for the
faithful performance of their respective duties, which said officers shall be liable
upon their said official bond, for the damages done by the unlawful or careless use
of any such weapon, whether such bond is so conditioned or not.
All other acts or parts of acts inconsistent with this act are hereby repealed.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol89/iss4/14

42

McNeely: The Right of Who to Bear What, When, and Where--West Virginia Fir
19871

RIGHT-TO-BEAR-ARMS AMENDMENT

1167

APPENDIX E
1925 W. VA. ACTS (First Extraordinary Sess.) ch. 3, § 7
§ 7. Carrying weapons.
If any person, without a state license therefor, carry about his person any
revolver or other pistol, dirk, bowie-knife, slung shot, razor, billy, metallic or
other false knuckles, or other dangerous or deadly weapon of like kind or
character, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof be confined in the county jail for a period of not less than six nor more than twelve months for the first offense; but upon conviction of the same person for the second offense in this state, he shall be guilty of a felony and be confined in the penitentiary
not less than one or more than five years, and in either case fined not less than fifty nor more than two hundred dollars, in the discretion of the court; and it shall be
the duty of the prosecuting attorney in all cases to ascertain whether or not the
charge made by the grand jury is the first or second offense, and if it shall be the
second offense, it shall be so stated in the indictment returned, and the prosecuting
attorney shall introduce the record of evidence before the trial court of said second
offense, and shall not be permitted to use his discretion in charging said second offense por in introducing evidence to prove the same on the trial; provided, that
boys or girls under the age of eighteen years, upon the second conviction, may, at
the discretion of the court, be sent to the industrial homes for boys and girls,
respectively, of the state. Any person desiring to obtain a state license to carry any
such weapon within one or more counties in this state shall first publish a notice in
some newspaper, published in the county in which he resides, setting forth his
name, residence and occupation, and that on a certain day he will apply to the circuit court of his county for such state license; and after the publication of such
notice for at least ten days before said application is made and at the time stated in
said notice upon application to said court, it may grant such person a license in the
following manner, to-wit:
The applicant shall file with said court his application in writing, duly verified,
which said application shall show:
First: That said applicant is a citizen of the United States of America.
Second: That such applicant has been a bona fide resident of this state for at
least one year next prior to the date of such application, and of the county sixty
days next prior thereto.
Third: That such applicant is over twenty-one years of age; that he is a person
of good moral character, of temperate habits, not addicted to intoxication, and
has not been convicted of a felony nor of any offense involving the use on his part
of such weapon in an unlawful manner.
Fourth: The purpose or purposes for which the applicant desires to carry such
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weapon and the necessity therefor and the county or counties in which said license
is desired to be effective.
Upon the hearing of such application the court shall hear evidence upon all
matters stated in such application and upon any other matter deemed pertinent by
the court, and if such court be satisfied from the proof that there is good reason
and cause for such person to carry such weapon, and all of the other conditions of
this act be complied with, said circuit court or the judge thereof in vacation, may
grant said license for such purposes, and no other, as said circuit court may set out
in the said license (and the word "court" as used in this act shall include the circuit
judge thereof, acting in vacation); but before the said license shall be effective such
person shall pay to the sheriff, and the court shall so certify in its order granting
the license, the sum of twenty dollars, and shall also file a bond with the clerk of
said court, in the penalty of three thousand five hundred dollars, with good security, signed by a responsible person or persons, or by some surety company,
authorized to do business in this state, conditioned that such applicant will not
carry such weapon except in accordance with his said application and as authorized
by the court, and that he will pay all costs and damages accruing to any person by
the accidental discharge or improper, negligent or illegal use of said weapon or
weapons. Any such license granted after this act becomes effective shall be good
for one year, unless sooner revoked, as hereinafter provided, and be co-extensive
with the county in which granted, and such other county or counties as the court
shall designate in the order granting such license; except that regularly appointed
deputy sheriffs having license shall be permitted to carry such revolver or other
weapons at any place, within the state, while in the performance of their duties as
such deputy sheriffs and except that any such license granted to regularly appointed railway police shall be co-extensive with the state, and all license fees collected hereunder shall be paid by the sheriff and accounted for to the auditor as
other license taxes are collected and paid, and the state tax commissioner shall
prepare all suitable forms for licenses and bonds and certificates showing that such
license has been granted and to do anything else in the premises to protect the state
and see to the enforcement of this act.
The clerk of the court shall immediately after license is granted as aforesaid,
furnish the superintendent of the department of public safety a certified copy of
the order of the court granting such license, for which service the clerk shall be
paid a fee of two dollars which shall be taxed as cost in the proceeding; within
thirty days after this act becomes effective it'shall be the duty of the clerks of each
court in this state having jurisdiction to issue pistol licenses to certify to the
superintendent of the department of public safety a list of all such licenses issued
in his county.
Provided, that nothing herein shall prevent any person from carrying any such
weapon, in good faith and not for a felonious purpose, upon his own premises,
nor shall anything herein prevent a person from carrying any such weapon (unloaded) from the place of purchase to his home or place of residence, or to a place
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of repair and back to his home or residence; but nothing herein shall be construed
to authorize any employee of any person, firm or corporation doing business in
this state to carry on or about the premises of such employer any such pistol, or
other weapon mentioned in this act for which a license is herein required, without
having first obtained the license and given the bond as herein provided; and, provided, further, that nothing herein shall prevent agents, messengers and other
employees of express companies doing business as common carriers, whose duties
require such agents, messengers and other employees to have the care, custody or
protection of money, valuables and other property for such express companies,
from carrying any such weapon while actually engaged in such duties, or in doing
anything reasonably incident to such duties; provided, such express company shall
execute a continuing bond in the penalty of thirty thousand dollars, payable unto
the state of West Virginia, and with security to be approved by the secretary of
state of the state of West Virginia, conditioned that said express company will pay
all damages, accruing to anyone by the accidental discharge or improper, negligent
or illegal discharge or use of such weapon or weapons by such agent, messenger or
other employee while actually engaged in such duties for such express company, in
doing anything that is reasonably incident to such duties; but the amount which
may be recovered for breach of such condition shall not exceed the sum of three
thousand five hundred dollars in any one case, and such bond shall be filed with
and held by the said secretary of state, for the purpose aforesaid, but upon the
trial of any cause for the recovery of damages upon said bond, the burden of
proof shall be upon such express company to establish that such agent, messenger
or other employee was not actually employed in such duties for such express company nor in doing anything that was reasonably incident to such duties at the time
such damages were sustained; and, providedfurther, that nothing herein shall prevent railroad police officers duly appointed and qualified under authority of section thirty-one of chapter one hundred forty-five of Barnes' code or duly qualified
under the laws of any other state, from carrying any such weapon while actually
engaged in their duties or in doing anything reasonably incident to such duties;
provided, such railroad company shall execute a continuing bond in the penalty of
ten thousand dollars payable unto the state of West Virginia and with security to
be approved by the secretary of state of the state of West Virginia conditioned that
said railroad company will pay all damages accruing to anyone by the accidental
discharge or improper, negligent or illegal discharge or use of such weapon or
weapons by such railroad special police officer whether appointed in this or some
other state while actually engaged in such duties for such railroad company, in doing anything that is reasonably incident to such duties, but the amount which may
be recovered for breach of such condition shall not exceed the sum of three thousand five hundred dollars in any one case, and such bond shall be filed with and
held by the said secretary of state for the purpose aforesaid but upon the trial of
any cause for the recovery of damages upon said bond, the burden of proof shall
be upon such railroad company to establish that such railroad police officer was
not actually employed in such duties for such railroad company nor in doing
anything that was reasonably incident to such duties at the
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time such damages were sustained; and provided, further, that in case of riot,
public danger and emergency, a justice of the peace, or other person issuing a warrant, may authorize a special constable and his posse whose names shall be set
forth in said warrant, to carry weapons for the purpose of executing a process, and
a sheriff in such cases may authorize a deputy or posse to carry weapons, but the
justice shall write in his docket the cause and reasons for such authority and the
name of the person, or persons, so authorized, and index the same, and the sheriff
or other officer shall write out and file with the clerk of the county court the
reasons and causes for such authority and the name, or names of the persons so
authorized, and the same shall always be open to public inspection, and such
authority shall authorize such special constable, deputies and posses to carry
weapons in good faith only for the specific purposes and times named in such
authority, and upon the trial of every indictment the jury shall inquire into the
good faith of the person attempting to defend such indictment under the authority
granted by any such justice, sheriff or other officer, and any such person or persons so authorized shall be personally liable for the injury caused to any person by
the negligent or unlawful use of any such weapon or weapons. It shall be the duty
of all ministerial officers, consisting of the justices of the peace, notaries public
and other conservators of the peace of this state, to report to the prosecuting attorney of the county the names of all persons guilty of violating this section, and
any person wilfully failing so to do, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be
fined not exceeding two hundred dollars, and shall, moreover, be liable to removal
from office for such willful failure; and it shall likewise be the duty of every person having knowledge of the violation of this act, to report the same to the prosecuting attorney, and to freely and fully give evidence concerning the same, and
any one failing so to do, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction
thereof shall be fined not exceeding one hundred dollars; provided, further, that
nothing herein contained shall be so construed as to prohibit sheriffs, their regularly appointed deputies, who actually collect taxes in each county, and all constables in their respective counties and districts, and all regularly appointed police
officers of their respective cities, towns or villages, all jailors and game protectors
who have been duly appointed as such, and members of the department of public
safety of this state, from carrying such weapons as they are now authorized by law
to carry, who shall have given bond in the penalty of not less than three thousand
five hundred dollars, conditioned for the faithful performance of their respective
duties, which said officers shall be liable upon their said official bond, for the
damages done by the unlawful or careless use of any such weapon or weapons,
whether such bond is so conditioned or not.
It shall be unlawful for any person armed with pistol, gun, or other dangerous
or deadly weapon, whether licensed to carry same or not, to carry, expose, brandish, or use, such weapon in a way or manner to cause, or threaten, a breach of the
peace. Any person violating this provision of this act shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction, shall be fined not less than fifty nor more than three
hundred dollars or imprisoned in the county jail not less than thirty nor more than
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ninety days, or be punished by both fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the
court.
Any circuit court granting any such license to carry any of the weapons mentioned in this act, the governor, or the superintendent of the department of public
safety, with the consent of the governor, may, for any cause deemed sufficient by
said court, or by the governor or by the superintendent of the department of public
safety with the approval of the governor aforesaid, as the case may be, revoke any
such license to carry a pistol or other weapon mentioned in this act for which a
license is required, and immediate notice of such revocation shall be given such
licensee in person, by registered mail or in the same manner as provided by law for
the service of other notices, and no person whose license has been so revoked shall
be re-licensed within one year thereafter; provided, that the authority so revoking
such license may, after a hearing, sooner reinstate such licensee.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person to carry, transport, or to have in his
possession any machine gun, sub-machine gun, and what is commonly known as a
high powered rifle, or any gun of similar kind or character, or any ammunition
therefor, except on his own premises or premises leased to him for a fixed term,
until such person shall have first obtained a permit from the superintendent of the
department of public safety of this state, and approved by the governor, or until a
license therefor shall have been obtained from the circuit court as in the case of
pistols and all such licenses together with the number identifying such rifle shall be
certified to the superintendent of the department of public safety. Provided,further, that nothing herein shall prevent the use of rifles by bona fide rifle club
members who are freeholders or tenants for a fixed term in this state at their usual
or customary place of practice, or licensed hunters in the actual hunting of game
animals. No such permit shall be granted by such superintendent except in cases of
riot, public danger, and emergency, until such applicant shall have filed his written
application with said superintendent of the department of public safety, in accordance with such rules and regulations as may from time to time be prescribed by
said department of public safety relative thereto, which application shall be accompanied by a fee of two dollars to be used in defraying the expense of issuing such
permit, and said application shall contain the same provisions as are required to be
shown under the provisions of this act by applicants for pistol license, and shall be
duly verified by such applicant, and at least one other reputable citizen of this
state. Any such permit as granted under the provisions of this act may be revoked
by the governor at his pleasure and upon the revocation of any such permit the
department of public safety shall immediately seize and take possession of any
such machine gun, sub-machine gun, high powered rifle, or gun of similar kind
and character, held by reason of said permit, and any and all ammunition
therefor, and the said department of public safety shall also confiscate any such
machine gun, sub-machine gun, and what is commonly known as a high powered
rifle, or any gun of similar kind and character and any and all ammunition
therefor so owned, carried, transported or possessed contrary to the provisions of
this act, and shall safely store and keep the same, subject to the order of the gover-
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nor. No alien shall own, keep or possess any firearm of any kind or character. It
shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to place or keep on public
display to passersby on the streets, for rent or sale, any revolver, pistol, dirk,
bowie knife, slung shot or other dangerous weapon of like kind or character or any
machine gun, sub-machine gun or high powered rifle or any gun of similar kind or
character, or any ammunition for the same.
All dealers licensed to sell any of the foregoing arms or weapons shall take the
name, address, age and general appearance of the purchaser, as well as the maker
of the gun, manufacturer's serial number and caliber, and report the same at once
in writing to the superintendent of the department of public safety.
It shall be unlawful for any person to sell, rent, give or lend any of the above
mentioned arms to an unnaturalized person.
Any person violating the provisions of sub-section (b) of this act shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be fined not less than fifty
dollars, nor more than three hundred dollars, or confined in the county jail not
less than thirty days nor more than six months, or both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.
All acts and parts of acts inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed.
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APPENDIX F
1975 W. VA. AcTs ch. 213
ARTICLE 7. DANGEROUS WEAPONS.
§ 61-7-2. License to carry weapons; how obtained.
Any person desiring to obtain a state license to carry any such weapon as is mentioned in the first section of this article, within one or more counties in this state,
shall first publish a notice setting forth his name, residence and occupation, and
that on a certain day he will apply to the circuit court of his county for such state
license. Such notice shall be published as a Class I legal advertisement in compliance with the provisions of article three, chapter fifty-nine of this code, and the
publication area for such publication shall be the county in which such person
resides. Such notice shall be published at least ten days before such application is
made. After the publication of such notice and at the time stated in such notice,
upon application to such court, it may grant such license to such person, in the
following manner, to wit:
The applicant shall file with such court his application in writing, duly
verified, which application shall show:
(a) That such applicant is a citizen of the United States of America;
(b) That the applicant has been a bona fide resident of this state for at least
one year next prior to the date of such application, and of the county sixty days
next prior thereto;
(c) That the applicant is over eighteen years of age; that he is a person of
good moral character, of temperate habits, not addicted to intoxication, not addicted to the use of any controlled substance, and has not been convicted of a
felony or of any offense involving the use on his part of such weapon in an
unlawful manner, and shall prove to the satisfaction of the court that he is gainfully employed in a lawful occupation and has been so engaged for a period of five
years next preceding the date of his application;
(d) The purpose or purposes for which the applicant desires to carry such
weapon, the necessity therefor, and the county or counties in which such license is
desired to be effective; and
(e) That the applicant has qualified under minimum requirements for handling and firing such firearms. These minimum requirements are those promulgated
by the department of natural resources and attained under the auspices of the
department of natural resources.
Upon the hearing of such application the court shall hear evidence upon all
matters stated in such application and upon any other matter deemed pertinent by
the court, and if such court be satisfied from the proof that there is good reason
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and cause for such person to carry such weapon, and all of the other conditions of
this article be complied with, the court, or the judge thereof in vacation, may grant
such license for such purposes, and no other, as such court, or the judge in vacation, may set out in the license (and the word "court" as used in this article shall
include the circuit judge thereof, acting either in term or vacation); but, before
such license shall be effective such person shall pay to the sheriff, and the court
shall so certify in its order granting the license, the sum of fifty dollars, and shall
also file a bond with the clerk of such court, in the penalty of five thousand
dollars, with good security, signed by a responsible person or persons, or by some
surety company, authorized to do business in this state, conditioned that such applicant will not carry such weapon except in accordance with his application and as
authorized by the court, and that he will pay all costs and damages accruing to any
person by the accidental discharge or improper, negligent or illegal use of such
weapon or weapons. Any such license granted shall be good for three years, unless
sooner revoked, as hereinafter provided, and be coextensive with the county in
which granted, and such other county or counties as the court shall designate in the
order granting such license; except that upon a proper showing the court granting
such license to any person regularly employed as a security guard may, in its
discretion, in the order granting such license extend the period of the validity of
such license for a period not to exceed four years, under such terms and conditions
as the court deems proper; except that regularly appointed deputy sheriffs having
license shall be permitted to carry such revolver or other weapons at any place,
within the state, while in the performance of their duties as such deputy sheriffs;
and except that any such license granted to regularly appointed railway police shall
be coextensive with the state. All license fees collected hereunder shall be paid by
the sheriff and accounted for to the auditor as other license taxes are collected and
paid, and the state tax commissioner shall prepare all suitable forms for licenses,
bonds and certificates showing that such license has been granted and shall do
anything else in the premises to protect the state and see to the enforcement of this
section.
The clerk of the circuit court shall, immediately after license is granted as
aforesaid, furnish the superintendent of the department of public safety a certified
copy of the order of the court granting such license, for which service the clerk
shall be paid a fee of two dollars which shall be taxed as cost in the proceeding. It
shall be the duty of the clerk of each circuit court to furnish to the superintendent
of the department of public safety, at any time so required, a certified list of all
such licenses issued in his county.
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APPENDIX G
HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION NO. 18
(By Delegate J. Martin and Delegate Carmichael)
(Introduced February 21, 1985; referred to the Committee on Constitutional Revision.)
Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the State of West
Virginia, amending article three thereof by adding thereto a new section,
designated section twenty-two, relating to the right of a person to keep
and bear arms; numbering and designating such proposed amendment;
and providing a summarized statement of the purpose of such proposed
amendment.
Resolved by the Legislature of West Virginia, two thirds of all the members
elected to each House agreeing thereto:
That the question of ratification or rejection of an amendment to the Constitution of the State of West Virginia be submitted to the voters of the State at the
next general election to be held in the year one thousand nine hundred eighty-six,
which proposed amendment is that article three thereof be amended by adding a
new section, designated section twenty-two, to read as follows:
ARTICLE III. BILL OF RIGHTS.
§ 22.

Right to keep and bear arms.

A person has the right to keep and bear arms for the defense of self, family,
home and state, and for lawful hunting and recreational use.
Resolved further, That in accordance with the provisions of article eleven,
chapter three of the code of West Virginia, one thousand nine hundred thirty-one,
as amended, such proposed amendment is hereby numbered "Amendment No. 1"
and designated as the "Right to Keep and Bear Arms Amendment" and the purpose of the proposed amendment is summarized as follows: "To allow a person to
keep and bear arms for defense of self, family, home and state and for
recreation."
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APPENDIX H
ANALYSIS OF
PROPOSED WEST VIRGINIA CONSTITUTIONAL
GUARANTEE TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS
A person has the right to keep and bear arms for the defense of self, family, home, and state, and for lawful hunting and recreational use.
This proposal explicitly protects the traditional lawful rights that gun owners
assumed were guaranteed in West Virginia.
A Person
The proposed amendment guarantees an individual right. Nevertheless, a person in a high risk category would not enjoy this right. That, e.g., felons, minors,
and the mentally infirm are treated differently has gained such universal acceptance that commentators mention only in passing that such persons do not enjoy
the full benefits of this right. Dowlut & Knoop, State Constitutions and the Right
to Keep and Bear Arms, 7 Okla. City U.L. Rev. 177, 191 & n. 71 (1982).
The Constitutions of 40* states contain a right to bear arms. These guarantees
have not been an obstacle to reasonable regulation. Statutes prohibiting possession
of firearms, e.g., by convicted felons have been consistently upheld. Examples of
such decisions include Carfield v. State, 649 P. 2d 865 (Wyo. 1982); State v. Fant,
53 Oh. App. 2d 87, 371 N.E.2d 588 (1977); State v. Amos, 343 So. 2d 166 (La.
1977); State v. Cartwright, 246 Ore. 121, 418 P. 2d 822 (1966); Jackson v. State,
68 So. 2d 850 (Ala. App. 1953), cert. denied 68 So. 2d 853 (1953). Over a century
ago a court upheld a conviction under a statute forbidding selling, giving, or lending weapons to minors. Coleman v. State, 32 Ala. 581 (1858).
*In the 1984 elections the voters in Utah strengthened their present guarantee and
the voters in North Dakota added a right to keep and bear arms to their constitution.
Keep and Bear Arms
The term "arms" refers only to such arms as are commonly kept by the people. Constitutionally protected arms would include the rifle, shotgun, and pistol.
State v. Kessler, 289 Ore. 359, 614 P.2d 94 (1980); Taylor v. McNeal, 523 S.W. 2d
148, 150 (Mo. App. 1975); Rinzler v. Carson, 262 So. 2d 661, 666 (Fla. 1972); People v. Brown, 253 Mich. 537, 235 N.W. 245 (1931); State v. Kerner, 181 N.C. 574,
107 S.E. 222 (1921); State v. Shelby, 90 Mo. 302, 2 S.W. 468 (1886); State v.
Duke, 42 Tex. 455, 458-59 (1875); State v. Andrews, 50 Tenn. 165, 8 Am. Rep. 8
(1871).
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Bombs, cannon, poison gas and the like are arms which do not come under the
protection of the constitutional umbrella. State v. Kessler, Rinzler v. Carson, People v. Brown, State v. Kerner, State v. Shelby, supra.
A person may only keep or bear constitutionally protected arms. The right to
keep arms includes the following:
What, then, is involved in this right of keeping arms? It necessarily involves the right to purchase and use them in such a way as is usual, or to
keep them for the ordinary purposes to which they are adapted... The
right to keep arms, necessarily involves the right to purchase them, to keep
in a state of efficiency for use, and to purchase and provide ammunition
suitable for such arms, and to keep them in repair. Andrews v. State, 50
Tenn. 165, 178, 8 Am. Rep. 8, 13 (1871).
The bearing of constitutionally protected arms may be regulated. Concealed
carrying statutes, e.g., are routinely upheld. State v. Kessler, 289 Ore. 359, 614
P.2d 94, 99 (1980); Holland v. Commonwealth, 294 S.W. 2d 83, 85 (Ky. 1956);
Porello v. State, 121 Oh. St. 280, 168 N.E. 135 (1929); McIntire v. Staie, 170 Ind.
163, 83 N.E. 1005 (1908); State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612, 35 Am. Dec. 44 (1840). Even
open carrying for an unlawful purpose may be prohibited. State v. Dawson, 272
N.C. 535, 159 S.E. 2d 1 (1968). A license may be required to carry a pistol away
from one's home, place of business, or land. Schubert v. DeBard, 73 Ind. Dec.
510, 398 N.E. 2d 1339 (Ind. App. 1980). Carrying a gun while drunk is outside the
protected boundaries of the right to bear arms. People v. Garcia, 197 Colo. 550,
595 P. 2d 228 (1979) (en bane). One may not be armed in court, church, at elections or concerts. Hill v. State, 53 Ga. 473, 476 (1874). Unauthorized parading
with arms may be prohibited. Commonwealth v. Murphy, 166 Mass. 171, 44 N.E.
138 (1896). Discharging a firearm without lawful excuse within the city limits is not
constitutionally protected conduct. State v. Johnson, 76 S.C. 39, 56 S.E. 544
(1907).
Defense of self, family, home
The lawful defense of self, family, and home has ancient roots. Halbrook, The
Jurisprudenceof the Second andFourteenth Amendment, 4 Geo. Mason L. Rev.
1, 5 (1981); Caplan, The Right of the Individual to BearArms: A Recent Judicial
Trend, 1982 Detroit Col. L. Rev. 789, 794; Dowlut & Knoop, State Constitutions
and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 7 Okla. City U.L. Rev. 177, 183 (1982);
Malcolm, The Right of the People to Keep and Bear Arms: The Common Law
Tradition, 10 Hastings Const. L. Q. 285 (1983).
There is no social interest in preserving the lives and wellbeing of criminal aggressors at the cost of their victims. The only defensible policy society can adopt is
one that will operate as a sanction against unlawful aggression. The police have no
duty to protect the individual. Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d 1 (D.C.
App. 1981) (en banc). One court reduced this principle of law to the succinct com-
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ment that "there is no constitutional right to be protected by the state against being murdered by criminals or madmen." Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th
Cir. 1982).
The proposed guarantee is a victims' rights measure. It will guarantee that a
person may exercise the choice to have arms to lawfully and effectively resist
violent criminal aggression against self, family, or home.
Defense of state
During World War II the National Guard was activated for overseas service.
In a number of states the armed citizens were called upon to perform militia duty
in an effort to protect the state and fill the void left by the absence of the National
Guard. The people served in the militia and used their personally owned firearms
to protect the state. See Dowlut and Knoop, State Constitutionsand the Right to
Keep and Bear Arms, 7 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 177, 196-98, 233-35 (1982).
Lawful hunting and recreationaluse
The constitutions of New Mexico, Nevada, and North Dakota explicitly
guarantee a right to have arms for lawful hunting and recreational use. The
seminal idea for this right may be traced to a 1787 Pennsylvania proposal based on
experiences with British game laws designed to disarm the people. Dowlut and Kno
State Constitutionsand the Right to Keep and BearArms, 7 Okla. City U. L. Rev.
177, 193 .
The term "lawful" was inserted as a matter of superabundant caution to indicate that hunting and recreational uses may be regulated by law. Thus possessing
a firearm on a game reserve for the purpose of hunting may be proscribed without
infringing on the right to bear arms. State v. McKinnon, 153 Me. 15, 133 A.2d 885
(1957).
Conclusion
This legislative history indicates that the legislature is left with the power to
deal effectively with criminal misconduct. On the other hand, it would prevent the
decent people of this state from being disarmed. State v. Kessler, 289 Or. 359, 614
P.2d 94 (1980); City of Lakewood v. Pillow, 180 Colo. 20, 501 P.2d 744 (1972);
City of Las Vegas v. Moberg, 82 N.M. 626, 485 P.2d 737 (Ct. App. 1971);
Glasscook v. City of Chattanooga, 157 Tenn. 518, 11 S.W. 2d 678 (1928); People
v. Zerillo, 219 Mich. 635, 189 N.W. 927 (1922); State v. Kerner, 181 N.C. 574, 107
S.E. 222 (1921).
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APPENDIX I
TEXT OF OCTOBER

26, 1986

NEWSPAPER ADVERTISEMENT

PROTECT YOUR RIGHTS
VOTE YES ON #1
On November 4, one of the most critical votes ever cast in West Virginia will protect your right to own and use firearms.
Amendment #1 will amend the West Virginia Constitution to include for the
first time a right to keep and bear arms protection in West Virginia.
Amendment #1 would add Section 22 to Article 3 of the Constitution of the
State of West Virginia to read as follows:
Section 22: "A person has the right to keep and beararms for the defense of self,
family, home and state, andfor lawful hunting and recreationaluse."
WHY YOU SHOULD
VOTE YES ON #1
* Forty states already have a state constitutional amendment; West Virginia will
make it forty-one.
" Yes on Amendment #1 protects the rights of all law-abiding citizens in West
Virginia because some courts have ruled that the Second Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution only applies to the Federal government and not to the states
(Quillici vs. the Village of Morton Grove, 1982).
* Amendment #1 keeps Federal and State firearms laws the law.
" Amendment #1 has been endorsed by most government officials including
Governor Arch Moore, the entire West Virginia delegation to the U.S. Congress,
more than 90% of the West Virginia Legislature, by the National Rifle Association of America, by the United Sportsmen of West Virginia, law enforcement
officials, and over 50,000 law-abiding NRA members in West Virginia.
JOIN THEM
VOTE YES ON #1
Paid political advertisement paid for by the United Sportsmen of West Virginia, the official political

action committee for the Yes on #1 Campaign of the National Rifle Association of America.
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APPENDIX J
TEXT OF NOVEMBER

2, 1986

NEWSPAPER ADVERTISEMENT

YES ON #1
On November 4, one of the most critical votes ever cast in West Virginia will
protect your right to own and use firearms.
Amendment #1 will amend the West Virginia State Constitution to include for
the first time a right to keep and bear arms guarantee in West Virginia.
Amendment #1 would add Section 22 to Article 3 of the Constitution of the
State of West Virginia to read as follows:
Section 22: "A person has the right to keep and beararms for the defense
of self, family, home and state, andfor lawful hunting and recreational
use. "1
INTENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT #1
* Yes on Amendment #1 guarantees that arms may be kept or carried for traditional purposes, such as hunting, target shooting, and self-defense. This includes
the right to purchase arms and ammunition and to keep arms in a state of
repair.
* Yes on Amendment #1.means that the individual right to keep and bear arms for
a Constitutionally protected purpose may not be infringed. Thus, laws banning
the possession or sale of Constitutionally protected arms, laws requiring a
license to possess or acquire such arms, requiring the registration of such arms
or imposing special taxation on such arms would not be permitted.
* Yes on Amendment #1 does not extend to every conceivable weapon or instrument. Constitutionally protected arms include rifles, shotguns, revolvers, pistols
and hunting knives, thus, weapons not commonly kept by the people, such as instruments of mass destruction such as bombs or rockets, find n6 protection
under this guarantee.
" Yes on Amendment #1 extends to open carrying of Constitutionally protected
arms. The bearing of arms concealed may b6 regulated by, for example, requiring a license to carry arms concealed. However, licensing would have to be administered with the right to bear arms in mind. Furthermore, the carrying of
arms may be restricted in places such as courtrooms or polling places.
" Yes on Amendment #1 does not protect those who misuse firearms. The types of
misconduct that the state legislature may forbid and punish are well-known and
self-evident. Examples of such misconduct include using arms to commit rob-

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol89/iss4/14

56

McNeely: The Right of Who to Bear What, When, and Where--West Virginia Fir
1987]

RIGHT-TO-BEAR-ARMS AMENDMENT

1181

bery, rape, burglary, assault; carrying arms while intoxicated; using arms to
unlawfully harass, intimidate, or recklessly endanger someone; shooting in an
unsafe place or manner; and poaching. Also, excluded from the enjoyment of
this right would be convicted felons, mental incompetents, minors and illegal
aliens. That such persons may be excluded is a well-established principle of law.
PROTECT YOUR RIGHTS
VOTE YES ON #1
Paid political advertisement paid for by the United Sportsmen of West Virginia, the official
political action committee for the Yes on #1 Campaign of the National Rifle Association of
America, Robert R. Legg, Jr., Treasurer.
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